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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
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The moral authority of the United States’ immigration control bureaucracy rests on the 
premise that undocumented immigrants are criminals and potential terrorists. Yet, this 
bureaucratic ideology contrasts starkly with the demographic reality of immigration flows, 
challenging the legitimacy of the government’s punitive enforcement strategies. The schism 
between bureaucratic ideology and on-the-ground experience is especially salient for border 
guards whose exposure to the humanity of aliens challenges the institutional logics that permeate 
their professionalization. This dissertation draws on semi-structured interviews with active U.S. 
Border Patrol agents to examine how they grapple with, and ultimately resolve the schism 
between ideology and the social reality of their daily work.  
I find that agents rely on state-created narratives on immigrant criminality, homeland 
security, and the importance of legal controls to establish the moral rightness of their 
professional role. However, these agents are not mere stand-ins that echo the government’s 
	   iii 
official discourse. My analysis reveals a constant negotiation between their function as state 
agents, and their subjectivity as people who are self-conscious of this role. Ultimately, though, 
agents do resolve the multiple contradictions they encounter on the job and end up reproducing 
the state’s ideologies, even when faced with ample evidence that contradicts their validity. 
Therefore, I argue that agents’ meaning making rationales are not merely self-serving identity 
processes—they also function as legitimation work, created and nourished by the state to justify 
its policies. As agents are socialized, they rely on these state-initiated narratives to cultivate a 
positive occupational identity and respond to outsiders’ criticism of their work. And, as agents 
cultivate self-legitimacy, they reveal and reproduce the broad assumptions, unspoken rules, and 
institutional logics that make up their professional culture and guide their daily practices. By 
making Border Patrol agents intelligible as individuals embedded within a particular bureaucratic 
system, this dissertation uncovers the hidden cultural scripts of this insular occupational group, 
as well as the  moral economy that undergirds the daily life of the United States’ immigration 
control system in the post 9/11 era.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Legitimizing Immigrant Criminality: 
A View from the Border 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The moral authority of the United States’ immigration control bureaucracy is premised on 
the idea that unauthorized immigrants are criminals and potential terrorists. Yet, the U.S. is no 
exception global migration trends, which are dominated by people fleeing persecution, poverty, 
and other hardships (Heyman and Symons 2012). This disjuncture between the securitization of 
immigration at the politico-bureaucratic level and its demographic reality creates legitimacy 
deficits for the U.S. immigration bureaucracy, which relies on its image crafting ideologies to 
justify its existence and gain support for its policies (Andreas 2009; Rodriguez and Paredes 
2014). These legitimacy deficits, or challenges to the normative foundation of the state’s moral 
authority to exclude foreigners, are especially salient for the agents charged with executing 
control on behalf of the state (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012) and remarkably perceptible at 
territorial borders. There, the armed personnel who are charged with performing sovereignty on 
behalf of the state meet people exercising their right to mobility, often in desperation (Mountz 
2010). Border guards’ grounded view of migration defies the dehumanizing ideologies that 
buttress their moral authority, impelling them to reconcile their two realities so that they can 
continue doing a morally ambiguous and politically contentious job (Pallister-Wilkins 2015). 
 Drawing on interviews with sixty active U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents working 
along the U.S.-Mexico border, I examine how they grapple with, and ultimately resolve the 
schism between politico-bureaucratic ideology and the reality of their daily work. I achieve this 
goal by probing the logics through which Border Patrol agents explain their job, describe their 
subjects, contest outsiders’ criticisms, and rationalize contentious aspects of their work. Four 
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substantive chapters provide an in-depth examination of Border Patrol agents’ occupational 
world, each demonstrating how the qualify immigrant criminality, just as they reproduce and 
legitimize it. First, I examine how agents sort immigrants into different categories of moral 
deservingness, only to disregard these distinctions in the name of security at the point of arrest. 
Second, I examine how Border Patrol agents legitimize the government’s punitive immigration 
control approach, especially in reference to non-criminal migrants who have morally justifiable 
reasons for breaking immigration law. Third, I focus on Latino agents, who share an ethno-racial 
background with the bulk of their work targets, to examine the tension between agents’ social 
group memberships and their professional role. Finally, I show how agents understand, wield, 
and defend their coercive power, by examining the norms that guide their use of force. 
I find that agents rely on readily-available narratives on immigrant criminality, homeland 
security, and the importance of legal controls to establish the moral rightness of their 
professional role. Nevertheless, agents are not mere stand-ins that echo the government’s official 
discourse. My analysis reveals a constant negotiation between their function as state agents, and 
their subjectivity as people who are self-conscious of this role. Ultimately, though, I demonstrate 
that agents do resolve their dissonance and end up reproducing the state’s ideologies, even when 
faced with ample evidence that contradicts their validity. Therefore, I argue that agents’ meaning 
making rationales are not merely self-created and self-serving identity processes. These 
meaning-making rationales also function as legitimacy work: narratives, claims, and rituals 
created and nourished by the state to justify its policies (see Thumala, Goold, and Loader 2011; 
Ugelvik 2016). As agents are professionally socialized, they begin to use and qualify these state-
initiated narratives to cultivate a positive occupational identity and respond to outsiders’ 
criticism of their work. And, as agents cultivate legitimacy, they reveal and reproduce the broad 
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assumptions, unspoken rules, and institutional logics that make up their professional culture and 
guide their daily practices.    
By studying this powerful, but enigmatic group my dissertation makes Border Patrol 
agents intelligible as individuals embedded within a particular bureaucratic system. This 
analysis, though, is not only about uncovering the hidden cultural scripts of an insular 
occupational group. By bringing in the lens of legitimacy, my work conceptualizes agents’ 
narratives as indicators of the state’s moral economy on border control. That moral economy is 
the collection of subjectivities that shapes the daily life of the United States highly guarded 
immigration control bureaucracy and other immigration systems throughout the world (Fassin 
2005; Fassin 2015).  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Legitimacy: A Window into the Normative Foundation of Immigration Agents’ Moral Authority 
 
The word “legitimacy” has a misleadingly intuitive character; something is legitimate 
when it is official, lawful, or permitted. Immigration control is legitimate from this lay 
perspective—modern nations have the sovereign right to control their borders and determine who 
remains within their territory (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004; Joppke 2010). However, legitimacy is 
not simply about legality; it is an inherently normative and relational concept (Bottoms and 
Tankebe 2012; Tyler and Jackson 2013). For my purposes, legitimacy is the state of having the 
moral authority to hold power over others (Barker 2001; Beetham 2013). The moral basis of 
legitimacy consists of a judgment about what is “right” or “wrong”. The inclusion of power 
highlights a relationship between power-holders and subjects. Therefore, a legal practice can 
suffer a legitimacy deficit when those subjected to the practice (or their representatives) question 
its moral basis.  
	   4 
Such is the case with immigration enforcement. While few debate the legality of 
immigration control, there are many who question whether it is morally right to exclude 
foreigners—especially when they have become de facto members of their communities 
(Ellermann 2006; Wells 2004), or when they arrive at territorial borders because they are fleeing 
persecution or otherwise looking to improve their lives (Heyman and Symons 2012). These 
questions about the morality of immigration control are accentuated at the implementation stage 
(Ellerman 2009), when the agents charged with the “dirty work” of enforcement face the people 
they are charged with excluding (Rivera 2015; Rivera and Tracy 2014).  
Indeed, unlike politicians and high-ranking bureaucratic leaders, Border Patrol agents 
enforce the law on people, making them privy, however marginally, to the human circumstances 
that surround the status of illegality (Heyman 2000; Heyman 2002). This exposure to human 
diversity defies the homogenization of foreigners and generates a disjuncture between agents’ 
bureaucratic socialization and the patterns of their daily work. To the extent that agents can 
resolve this disjuncture, then they are successful in “confirming to themselves the moral validity 
of their positions of authority” (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012: 154) and the broader system’s moral 
rightness. This legitimacy allows them to continue with an uncritical performance of their role as 
the coercive arm of the state and as enforcers of legal, citizenship, and racial boundaries (Fassin 
2011; Hiemstra 2014).  
By identifying what agents perceive as the moral basis of their coercive power, we can 
also reveal largely unspoken elements of their law enforcement occupational culture. 
Occupational cultures are important because they contain meaning-making rationales and the 
principles of conduct that generate routine practices among professionals (Manning 2010). By 
functioning as cognitive heuristics that facilitate judgments and categorizations, occupational 
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cultures generate particular ways of understanding policing, along with its problems and 
“optimal” solutions (Cockcroft 2013). Although these scripts are not static, they are highly 
resilient because they are constantly being reproduced and reinforced through professional 
training and informal on-the-job socialization (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010). In addition, 
professional identities and missions serve a particularly important function in the implementation 
of contentious polices areas, like immigration, because bureaucrats resolve ambiguity and 
dilemmas by relying on these standards (Matland 1995). Therefore, Border Patrol agents’ 
occupational culture has material implications for how they carry out their duties (Côté-Boucher, 
Infantino, and Salter 2014; Loftus 2009; Loftus 2015).  
While existing research on the implementation of immigration law provides critical 
insights into the occupational lives of these bureaucrats, it does not provide a sustained analytic 
focus on this important mechanism, nor does it employ the lens of legitimacy. Instead, in their 
effort to open up the black box of policy implementation, scholars have focused on discretionary 
decision-making processes and outcomes. To extend this work, my dissertation looks behind 
discretion to reveal the normative rationales that shape it.  
Looking Behind Discretion: Immigration Agents’ Occupational Culture 
Seminal studies have taken us “Inside the State” (Calavita 1992) to demonstrate how 
immigration bureaucrats shape law through their administrative discretion. These policy 
implementers negotiate multiple stakeholder interests with their own sense of mission, to meet 
ambiguous policy goals within an ever-shifting political environment (Magaña 2003). 
Bureaucrats working in this area often feel misunderstood by the public and perceive themselves 
as being at the whim of elected officials’ case work, as well as grassroots political advocacy 
(Ellermann 2006; Wells 2004). It is within this context that inspectors determine who is 
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admissible to the United States (Gilboy 1991; Gilboy 1992), that criminal investigators and 
deportation officers decide which cases to pursue (Weissinger 1996), and that agents patrol the 
U.S.-Mexico borderlands (Heyman 2009; Maril 2003). This research paints a picture that is 
familiar to scholars of street-level bureaucracies, where frontline staff who appear to be low-
level employees are actually powerful actors who generate the gap between law on the books and 
law in action through their discretionary decisions (Lipsky 2010).    
While this work is an excellent springboard for my research, it lacks a sustained 
engagement with immigration agents’ occupational culture or their bureaucratic personalities 
(Oberfield 2014). Bureaucratic personalities are composed of three interdependent factors: 
identities (how bureaucrats understand themselves in relation to their organization), attitudes 
(how bureaucrats understand the people that their agencies serve and the problems that drive 
their work), and motivations (why bureaucrats choose to be employed in their organizations). 
These personalities are not individual-level proclivities; they are socially constructed and 
reproduced within a particular bureaucratic context (Ibid.). Once new occupational members are 
socialized into their professional role, they take on these personalities and their behavior tends to 
follow a logic of appropriateness based on their role. This logic of appropriateness shapes 
behavior by providing readily-available interpretations of “problems” and shared definitions of 
appropriate behavior for a member of this occupational group (March and Olsen 2011).  
Although bureaucratic personalities provide interpretive and behavioral blueprints, it is 
important not to overemphasize their influence. Bureaucrats are seldom apolitical implementers 
of the interests of others (Baekgaard, Blom-Hansen, and Serritzlew 2014; Meier and Bohte 
1993), but neither is their discretion completely unbound. They work within the confines of 
institutional rules and structures, as well as their own interpretation of their professional 
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mandates (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). It is important, therefore, to investigate the 
institutional structures within which bureaucrats function.  
The Institutional Context of U.S. Immigration Control 
Since 2003, American immigration bureaucrats have been employees of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS)—a cabinet-level agency whose 22 components all have the 
mission of  protecting the United States and its values from a variety of external threats, and 
terrorism specifically. Three of the 22 DHS components carry out immigration functions: United 
States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) provides services, while Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are charged with 
enforcement at/between ports of entry and in the interior of the country. The fact that the DHS 
separates service from enforcement is critical, because this does away with the conflicting 
missions that caused major bureaucratic frustration in its predecessor, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services agency (INS). Mission streamlining was accompanied by other major 
changes, like more independent funding streams for each arm of the immigration bureaucracy. A 
look at the DHS budget in fiscal year 2017 shows that the enforcement arm is privileged over 
service; together, CBP and ICE claim 30 percent of the DHS’s 67 billion dollar budget, while 
USCIS is allocated 6 percent (Johnson 2017). Equally important as the budget apportionment is 
the distinct training that immigration service bureaucrats and enforcement agents receive. The 
Border Patrol training is a case in point. 
Before U.S. Border Patrol agents “hit the line”, they have gone through a 19-week course 
at a residential law enforcement training academy, which consists of classroom instruction in law 
and Spanish, as well as hands-on physical training, firearms instruction, and driving practice. 
The academy takes place at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New 
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Mexico and is meant to give agents foundational law enforcement skills that they will 
subsequently hone through months-long “field training” at their station. This second stage 
consists of additional classroom instruction, as well as guided on-the-job training in a variety of 
duties (e.g. patrolling the border in an SUV, tracking footprints through mountains, checkpoints, 
etc.), conducted under the supervision of a senior agent. Therefore, by the time agents make their 
first apprehension, they have undergone extensive preparation in law enforcement practices and 
procedures, which closely mirror the paramilitary character of police training. The 
professionalization process that agents undergo during this time is as important as the police 
skills they acquire; they are socialized into a culture that is premised on the idea that they are the 
“good guys” who are charged with getting the “bad guys” (Herbert 1996). In this case, the bad 
guys are an assorted variety of criminals who are trying to enter the United States through the 
southern border: previously-deported aggravated felons, drug and human smugglers, armed 
cartel members, and cunning terrorists. 
The Border Patrol’s paramilitary-style, law enforcement orientation is not new (Dunn 
1996), but its coercive role has become more solidified in the past thirty years. Since the 1980s, 
the United States has passed a number of laws that have criminalized immigration violations and 
dramatically expanded its enforcement apparatus, resulting in a record number of deportations 
from the interior and the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border (Dowling and Inda 2013). 
Juliet Stumpf (2006) coined the term “crimmigration” to refer to this growing overlap between 
immigration and criminal law. In today’s era, criminal violations carry severe immigration 
consequences, just as immigration violations are often treated as criminal offenses (Eagly 2017; 
Eagly 2014; Wolfe, Pyrooz, and Spohn 2010). In this era, police officers can function as 
immigration agents (Armenta 2012; Motomura 2010), and immigration agents can use the 
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intelligence and infrastructure of local law enforcement agencies to identify and remove non-
citizens (Cox and Miles 2013). Today, immigrants awaiting their administrative hearings are 
held in detention centers owned and managed by privately owned prison companies (Macías-
Rojas 2016; Noferi 2014), where their criminal record determines whether or not they can bond 
out of these detention facilities (Ryo 2016). In addition, immigration cases now outnumber all 
other types of cases in federal courts, making this the most frequently-prosecuted federal crime 
in the United States (Hartley and Tillyer 2012).  
Therefore, today’s immigration agents function within a bureaucratic and political 
context that conflates immigration enforcement with homeland security and crime control. The 
enforcement arms of the immigration bureaucracy reflect the criminal justice system in ideology 
and practice, and even share its infrastructure (McLeod 2012; Miller 2005). These important 
changes highlight the need to update our understanding of these bureaucrats, and understand 
them, not simply as policy implementers, but as social control agents who wield the coercive 
power of the Department of Homeland Security in the era of crimmigration. To this end, I turn to 
the literature on policing and the theoretical lenses of criminology.  
Immigration Enforcement Agents as Police Officers  
Immigration control agents are a particular type of bureaucrat—they are federal law 
enforcement officers. This is an important distinction that the literature on immigration policy 
implementation does not sustain analytically, although there are some notable exceptions. For 
example, Ellermann (2009) rightly notes that deportation officers are charged with coercive 
social control and argues that that their enforcement ethos make them less likely to “shirk” their 
duties than other bureaucrats. Weissinger (1996) highlights that because INS investigators were 
inclined toward “real police work” they became frustrated with the conflicting mission of the 
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organization. In studying how Border Patrol agents do their job, Heyman (2009) and Maril 
(2006) also note that their law enforcement orientation creates a very particular way of 
understanding immigration as a social phenomenon and as a work task. Yet, these studies were 
conducted before the emergence of the Department of Homeland Security and just as the 
crimmigration system was taking hold. In addition, this research does not sustain an engagement 
with the broader literatures on police culture and legitimacy, focusing instead on discretion.  
Research on police culture is a productive site for those of us interested in the normative 
rationales that underlie immigration agents’ worldviews and practices. This literature is mostly 
based on research with city cops, apart from recent calls to examine the “inner world of border 
policing” (Loftus 2015: 119) and the “the everyday professional routines and administrative 
procedures of those involved in the governance of border security” (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, 
and Salter 2014: 195). The main call among these scholars is to identify how the practice logics 
of border agents mirror or diverge from those of other law enforcement agents. We know that the 
structure and culture of policing organizations is highly paramilitaristic, characterized by high 
levels of specialization, complex divisions of labor, vertical authority structures, strict and 
extensive rule systems, and a clear expectation of discipline for veering from protocol (Chappell 
and Lanza-Kaduze 2010: 188). Furthermore, law enforcement socialization emphasizes danger, 
which fosters an us/them culture or “esprit de corps” that creates a sense of loyalty to law 
enforcement “insiders”, while separating them from “outsiders” (Cockcroft 2013). As a result, 
law enforcement officials tend to feel misconstrued and underappreciated by the public, that they 
perceive as unaware and ungrateful of the risks they take on their behalf. Often, they also feel 
betrayed by high-ranking officials in their organization whom they see as pandering to political 
interests instead of standing up for their rank and file. These elements of police culture have 
	   11 
proven durable across time and national contexts, suggesting that these ways of understanding 
are a constant feature of the law enforcement role itself (Loftus 2009; Paoline 2003). 
These tenets of police culture resonate with what we know about the U.S. immigration 
bureaucracy’s punitive control approach. However, there are valid reasons to question whether 
the logics of law enforcement agencies are a good fit for the management of migration. That is, 
law enforcement agents are primarily concerned with law abidance and dealing with “bad guys” 
–this is what they have been trained and socialized to do (Herbert 1996). But this law 
enforcement orientation contrasts starkly with the demographic reality of immigration traffic. 
Consequently, the typical immigrant that border agents deal with does not conform to the ideal-
type “bad guy” that is created and nourished through their occupational training and identity 
(Pallister-Wilkins 2015).  
I argue that this schism between ideology and social reality is a threat to Border Patrol 
agents’ moral authority, which is founded on the idea that they are the “good guys” who are 
engaged in righteous fight against criminals. This schism also creates legitimacy issues for the 
broader immigration control system that these agents represent. Agents are compelled to address 
legitimacy issues because this is a critical resource that validates their organization (Johnson, 
Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006; Suchman 1995) and an important source of moral validation that 
allows them achieve their contentious control mandates (Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Tyler, 
Callahan, and Frost 2007). I capitalize on this inherent pull toward justification (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006) by analyzing their meaning-making rationales through the lens of legitimacy. By 
doing so, I achieve the dual goals of making explicit their occupational culture, as well as 
revealing the normative foundation upon which they rest their moral authority. Before describing 
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my methods, I first discuss how the concept of legitimacy has been studied in criminology, and 
recently in the area of immigration control (Bosworth 2013; Ryo 2013; Stumpf 2013).  
This Study’s Theoretical Framework: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimation   
Tom Tyler’s seminal book, “Why People Obey the Law” (2006) is often credited with 
initiating a now well-established body of work on legitimacy in criminology. Tyler demonstrates 
that authorities and systems with legitimacy deficits have difficulty securing voluntary 
compliance from their subjects. This insight underscores the functional role that legitimacy plays 
for law enforcement officers and other legal authorities. That is, if having legitimacy is so 
important for these power-holders, then it follows that researchers should study how they 
cultivate this important resource (see for example Barker 2001; Beetham 2013). However, as the 
title of Tyler’s book suggests, his emphasis was on the effects of legitimacy on those subject to 
power, which overlooks the process by which those in power cultivate a moral authority 
(Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Harkin 2015).  
Legitimacy, the moral authority to hold power over others, is fundamental for policing 
organizations and for law enforcement agents (Justice and Mesko 2015; Tyler 2006b). Without 
legitimacy, policing organizations and other legal systems have difficulty securing compliance 
from their “subjects” (Jackson, Tyler, Hough, Bradford, and Mentovich 2014). In fact, Latin 
American immigrants’ perceptions that U.S. border enforcement is illegitimate partly explains 
how otherwise law-abiding people break immigration law (Ryo 2013; Ryo 2015). But beyond 
securing compliance from those subject to law, possessing a moral authority is also essential to 
legal authorities themselves. This is especially true for social control agents who wield coercive 
power on behalf of the state. By creating a social reality where their coercive power is 
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appropriate and valid, legitimacy rationalizes the moral dubiousness of social control and allows 
agents to do their job (Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Tyler, Callahan, and Frost 2007).  
Overlooking legal authorities’ legitimation strategies prevents scholars from revealing the 
substance of their claims to legitimacy (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz 2014). Without 
understanding the foundation upon which these powerful actors base their moral authority, we 
lack a critical piece of information to evaluate alignment or misalignment between their claims 
and the public’s views (Tankebe 2013). It is also possible that legal authorities’ belief in their 
self-legitimacy impacts how they carry out their role (Justice and Mesko 2015). However, 
without sustained attention to the process of legitimation, we miss an opportunity to capture the 
form, function, and effects of power-holders’ quest for legitimacy.   
Bottoms and Tankebe’s (2012) dialogic approach to legitimacy has the potential to fill 
this gap. These authors remind us that legitimacy is not only the product of fair treatment and 
transparent decision-making (or “procedural justice” a la Tyler), but also of powerful actors’ 
ideological efforts to establish their moral authority (Harkin 2015). Bottoms and Tankebe define 
legitimacy as a contingent product of an iterative process of call and response—i.e. a dialogue—
between those in power and multiple audiences. This definition highlights that actors’ claims to 
legitimacy are always in response to what they perceive as the public’s views of their moral 
authority (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz 2014). Although most research on legitimation focuses on 
the ruling elite (Barker 2001), Bottoms and Tankebe emphasize that “junior power holders” are 
also critical to study.  
Junior power holders—street cops, prison guards, and other low to mid-level social 
control agents, like immigration officers—are in a unique position vis-à-vis their organizations 
and the public. As the state’s coercive arm, they have a great deal of power to shape the 
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qualitative character of people’s interactions with the government, yet as policy implementers, 
they are low in the command structure of their organizations. Their coercive role and low-level 
institutional position generate constant challenges to their moral authority, and these are 
highlighted in their interactions with the public. This is why “the further one climbs downward 
on the rungs of an organizational structure, the greater the energy, time and intensity of 
legitimation for the confirmation of claims to authority” (Tankebe In Press: 11). Therefore, even 
though we have excellent research showing that the Department of Homeland Security bases its 
moral authority on the idea that immigrants are criminals and terrorists (Andreas 2009; Jones 
2014; Rodriguez and Paredes 2014), without grounded analyses of how frontline agents use and 
contest these ideologies, our understanding of their power and limitations is incomplete. Just as 
we might expect immigration agents to use state-created ideologies to legitimize their authority, 
it is also possible that these macro-level ideologies are inadequate to deal with the everyday 
dilemmas they encounter on the job.  
Responding to Bottoms and Tankebe’s (2012) calls to take a dialogic approach to 
legitimacy, this study examines how Border Patrol agents’ legitimation work is shaped by their 
engagement with the public’s challenges to their moral authority. By examining how agents 
contest outsiders’ criticism of their job, I reveal the “legitimacy myths” that underpin their belief 
that the state’s punitive immigration control approach is “normatively appropriate” (Tyler 2005: 
212). I argue that agents’ legitimacy claims are more than stigma management techniques that 
allow stigmatized workers to create a positive occupational identity (Rivera 2015; Rivera and 
Tracy 2014; Thumala, Goold, and Loader 2011); my respondents use these rhetorical devices to 
talk a legitimate social system into reality (Ugelvik 2016). By allowing agents to construct a 
reality in which the policies they are implementing are “just,” these narratives defy outsiders’ 
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critiques and rationalize the internal conflict agents experience. In effect, my analysis reveals the 
normative foundation upon which Border Patrol agents’ occupational culture is built.   
The Case: The United States Border Patrol 
The USBP is the longest-existing and largest apparatus of immigration control in the 
United States’ history. Originally founded as a low-budget outfit of local men in the American 
Southwest, today it deploys over 21,000 agents, a budget of almost 4 million dollars, military-
grade technology and weapons, and bipartisan political support for its mission of protecting the 
American homeland through border security. The organization is primed to grow under the 
Trump administration, whose 2018 budget plans include an investment of 2.6 billion dollars in 
infrastructure and technology, in addition to millions in funding to hire at least 5000 new Border 
Patrol agents over the next ten years.  
The Border Patrol’s continued growth belies a controversial history of violence and 
racism in the Southwest. Border Patrol agents in the first 50 years of the organization were white 
men who were rooted in the deep racial divides of the American southwest. As a consequence, 
they understood the legal-illegal boundary as a racialized one, where Mexicans were the 
archetype “illegal alien” (Lytle-Hernandez 2010). While the USBP is no longer a predominately 
white organization—a full fifty percent of its agents’ are Hispanic—Mexicans are still the 
primary target of their work (Armenta and Vega 2017). Their violent reputation has not subsided, 
as evidenced by consistent accusations of excessive use of force, abuse of immigrants in custody, 
and an overall lack of accountability (Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez, Hernandez-Leon, and Bailey 
1999; Martínez, Slack, and Heyman 2013; Martínez, Cantor, and Ewing 2014; Phillips, Hagan, 
and Rodriguez 2006). Furthermore, despite efforts to rebrand the Border Patrol as America’s 
premier defense against terrorism, we know that border escalation is intimately bound to nation-
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building, racism, xenophobia, and construction of the other—both inside and outside the country 
(Nevins 2010). In effect, territorial borders are physical manifestations of the symbolic 
boundaries between “us” and “them” (Fassin 2011). Therefore, the militarization of the U.S.-
Mexico border is as much a performative act of nation-building (Andreas 2009), as it is a tactical 
deterrence strategy (Dunn 1996).  
Border Patrol agents’ duty of policing the symbolic and territorial boundaries of the 
United States, in combination with their organization’s polemical history, makes it necessary to 
bring in the concept of legitimacy to understand their occupational culture. Without this lens, 
scholars risk overlooking that the scripts and rationales that undergird agents’ occupational 
culture reflect the state’s position in the broader symbolic politics of immigration control and are 
nourished by the state’s image crafting strategies. Furthermore, while all social actors aim to 
engage in justifiable behavior (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), this pull toward justification is 
especially strong for people involved in morally dubious and otherwise stigmatized labor 
(Ashforth and Kreiner 1999; Grandy and Mavin 2011; Löfstrand, Loftus, and Loader 2015). 
Such is the case for Border Patrol agents who enforce highly politicized laws within a very 
powerful federal department and under a paramilitary organizational structure that prescribes 
narrow roles for its personnel. Therefore, any study of Border Patrol agents’ occupational 
culture, must contend with the performative aspect of their narratives and the structural roots of 
their meaning making rationales. 
METHODS 
 This dissertation pursues three interconnected goals: to reveal the normative tenets of 
Border Patrol agents’ law enforcement culture; to show how these tenets shape their social 
construction of immigrants; to illustrate how their culture impacts their reported practices. 
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Analytically, I frame agents’ meaning-making rationales as part of a more fundamental effort to 
cultivate a moral authority, given the moral dubiousness and political contentiousness of their 
job. I also understand agents’ narratives as emerging from and reproducing the image-crafting 
strategies that the state uses to preserve this ill-reputed organization and legitimize its punitive 
approach to immigration control.    
Primary Data Source 
Semi-structured interviews with Border Patrol agents (n=60) are the primary source of 
data for this dissertation. I conducted the interviews over the course of 18 months, between 
September 2014 and March 2016 in Arizona and California. Interviews lasted between 50 
minutes and 2.5 hours, were audio recorded, and were professionally transcribed. The interviews 
focused on agents’ work experiences, starting from the point when they became interested in this 
career and then delving more deeply into various aspects of their work routines. I developed this 
strategy to build rapport with agents and avoid making them feel reticent during our 
conversation, since they are prohibited from discussing operational strategies and usually avoid 
discussing their job with outsiders. My interview approach, which resembles an oral history in 
the beginning and evolves into more structured questions, was a productive way to reveal the 
bureaucratic rules and ideologies, as well as the unspoken assumptions that guide agents’ work 
practices. See Appendix A, Table 1 for sample characteristics. 
Research Sites 
Border Patrol agents work within United States Border Patrol, which is situated under the 
larger Customs and Border Protection agency. The U.S. Border Patrol is divided into 20 
“sectors” assigned to different Areas of Responsibility (AOR) along the northern, southern, and 
coastal borders of the United States. Arizona and California each have 2 sectors. I chose to 
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interview agents from neighboring sectors that are of similar size. I call these sectors “Desert 
Town,” Arizona and “Center City,” California. Minimizing the between-sector variation in AOR 
size, number of agents assigned to that sector, and type of terrain that agents work was important 
to avoid introducing additional contextual variables that could shape my findings. Appendix B, 
Table 2 provides an overview of the most relevant characteristics of each sector during fiscal 
years 2014 and 2015, when I collected these data. 
Recruitment  
Border Patrol agents are a hard-to-reach population, but not in the traditional sense which 
usually refers to marginalized groups. As federal agents and employees of the Department of 
Homeland Security, these agents can be considered “elites” or individuals with social status, 
professional authority and/or expertise that make them difficult to access and study (Burnham, 
Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry 2008). The main difference between interviewing elites and other 
hard-to-reach populations is that the balance of power between the researcher and the “subject” 
can be disproportionately in favor of the elite interviewee. This is so because elites are usually 
skilled at controlling their agenda, delivering pre-determined messages, and have access to 
gatekeeping resources (e.g. public relations departments) that allow them to deflect questions or 
interactions they do want (Mikecz 2012; Morris 2009). To boot, Border Patrol agents’ 
organizational culture is much like other law enforcement organizations in that they are reticent 
about trusting “outsiders” (see Paoline 2004).  
The combined effect of the official gatekeeping resources of the DHS and the 
organizational culture of agents discards probability sampling as a viable option for researchers 
interested in studying this population. Therefore, following a purposive sampling approach by 
first gaining the trust of key informants and obtaining official clearance is the most feasible 
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option for gaining access to this population. Since policy states that agents should defer to Public 
Affairs officials when approached by researchers or members of the press or public, securing 
clearance from this entity was central to gaining access. However, I had to be careful not to let 
the public affairs office shape my sample or interview content.  
Therefore, I proceeded by first seeking clearance at the headquarters at each of the two 
Border Patrol sectors I studied. In Desert Town, I met a public affairs supervisor in person to 
describe the study and ask for his advice on how to gain access to agents. This supervisor turned 
out to be an ally who ushered my application through a very strict chain of command. Once I 
secured official clearance, this agent set up interview appointments for me. This initial sample of 
11 interviewees at the Desert Town sector is made up of senior personnel, with an average of 
approximately 15 years of experience. Interviewing this sample was strategic, both because they 
are managers who wield a strong influence over the sector’s policies and practices, but also 
because securing their cooperation meant that they were less likely to obstruct my subsequent 
data collection. Subsequently, I was able to snowball sample a wider variety of agents who were 
not affiliated with Public Affairs and who were less senior than this initial group of interviewees.  
I attempted the same strategy in the Center City sector, but found the public affairs 
supervisor was less active in facilitating my access beyond the 14 agents that worked in his 
office. Without the support of the supervisor, which serves both a symbolic purpose (validating 
my presence at BP events) and a practical one (exposing me to agents to snowball from) I had a 
more difficult time securing interviewees than in the Arizona sector. Therefore, my sample is 
smaller and less diverse in Center City, especially in terms of the type of position held by the 
agents I interviewed. Most notably, whereas only one quarter of the Arizona sector agents I 
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interviewed were affiliated with public affairs, 74% percent of the California agents were from 
this office.  
It is important to note that agents working in the public affairs officer are regular Border 
Patrol agents who are fulfilling a temporary assignment in this office. Depending on the length of 
their assignment, they will go back out in the field or do another “temporary detail” within a year 
of being in public affairs. Therefore, while these agents do receive public affairs training to 
fulfill their role vis-à-vis the media or community relations role, they are not public affairs 
professionals. Nevertheless, the limitation of having so many public affairs officers in my 
interview sample is that they could have been less candid in their interviews, approaching our 
conversation in their capacity as an organizational representative. Even if that were the case, it 
would not discount the value of these interviews. In fact, it is precisely the performative nature of 
data meant for public consumption that makes them excellent indicators of the ideologies upon 
which policing organizations rests their legitimacy (Harkin 2015; Mawby 2013). However, I do 
believe that the conversational character of my interview approach swayed agents away from the 
formal public affairs role. To confirm this impression, I compared the responses of public affairs 
and non-public affairs agents and found that the major difference was Center City agents’ 
unwillingness to answer questions about the impact of politics on policy. This increases my 
confidence that the major effect of public affairs affiliation is an unwillingness to talk about 
certain topics, as opposed to major differences in the qualitative character and content of 
interview responses.  
Recruitment Script 
As I gained access to the organization and recruited agents for interviews, I always 
presented myself as a neutral researcher, interested in situating their viewpoints in the literature 
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on immigration law enforcement. Given the media’s consistent and critical coverage of the 
USBP, I felt compelled to clarify that I was not a media reporter as I introduced myself. 
However, I was always aware that interviews give research participants an opportunity to 
construct an ideal moral self (Presser 2004). Therefore, I expected that despite my generic 
introductory script, agents would use me—an outsider to the organization—as a proxy for 
different segments of the public or audiences. At times, the audience I proxied was friendly, as 
when an agent told me he was “grateful that someone was finally telling our story.” Most of the 
time, though, agents had difficulty identifying my position, as they preceded comments with 
statements like,  “I don’t know where you stand on this, but…” or sought to justify particularly 
controversial statements with comments such as “I know that sounds bad, we just have a dark 
sense of humor.” It is likely that their perception of me as friend or foe played some part in 
shaping the type of ideal self they recounted. Agents who perceived me as friendly may have 
been more likely to abandon “press release” versions of themselves, or culturally preferred 
accounts of their viewpoints (Wiersma 1988). On the other hand, those who viewed me with 
skepticism may have been more guarded, keeping the interviews within the bounds of “political 
correctness” or professional messaging. In reality, I had both types of interviews, and many in 
between these two ends of the spectrum. Despite this variation, what remained constant was 
agents’ sense that they were members of a deprecated social group. 
 This sense of persecution was tied specifically to their job. Restrictionists saw them as 
failing to do enough to protect the border, while immigrant advocates saw them as “dream 
crushers.” Other research on “tainted trades” demonstrates that interviews give stigmatized 
workers an opportunity to create a positive occupational identity through legitimation (Thumala, 
Goold, and Loader 2011). In my work, I found that this occupational stigma had a standardizing 
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effect on the type of ideal self agents constructed. In other words, regardless of whether they 
thought I was a friend or foe, they saw the interview as an opportunity to correct some 
misconceptions that people had about them. As a result, I argue that content of my interviews 
depended less on what agents believed I thought of them than on their fixation with the general 
public’s misperceptions about them and their job. 
Participant Observation.  I participated in two distinct iterations of a “Border Patrol Citizens’ 
Academy,” one at each of the two sectors that are the focus of this study. The Citizens’ Academy 
is a component of the Border Patrol’s national-level objective to increase the organization’s 
engagement with the community. Per the Border Patrol’s 2012-2015 strategic plan: 
The Citizens Academy informs the public about the organizational structure of DHS, 
CBP, and the Border Patrol. It is designed to provide the community with an overview of 
the complex and challenging enforcement skills taught to all new Border Patrol agents at 
the Border Patrol Academy, in addition to insight into the daily challenges Border Patrol 
agents face as they perform their duties (p. 21). 
 
The two academies I participated were similar in structure. Between 15 and 20 
participants are selected by the public affairs office and they meet 3-4 hours on a weekday 
evening over the course of 5-6 weeks. To participate, there is a short application that is followed 
by a criminal background check. Once prospective participants are cleared, they are contacted by 
an agent in the public affairs office to inform them that they have been selected to participate, 
and telling them about the first meeting time and location. The meetings always start off at the 
sector’s headquarters, but participants are often transported to other locations in the sector’s area 
of responsibility in Border Patrol vans and SUVs.    
Although the academies are structured similarly, there was a qualitative difference in the 
character of each academy. The Arizona academy included a mixed group of participants, 
varying in race and age from senior citizens (mostly white men), to middle-aged professionals 
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(mostly Latinas), and an assorted group of mostly Latina/o, but also white male and female 
college students. When asked to introduce ourselves and our interest in the academy, participants 
expressed distinct reasons for participating, ranging from “because I am concerned about border 
security” (white senior citizen woman) to “I want to learn about this career so that I can tell my 
students about it” (middle-aged Latina high school counselor), to “I am thinking of applying to 
the Border Patrol” (young Latino man). In contrast, the California academy was made up almost 
entirely of young Latina/os (mostly second-generation Mexican Americans and one African 
American woman) who were “Justice Studies” majors at the local community college and had 
learned about the academy through one of their classes where Border Patrol agents made a career 
presentation. As a result, all of the participants were interested in the Border Patrol as a career, 
and at least 2 participants were already in the process of applying to work for CBP.  
I use these observations to contextualize agents’ worldviews within the bureaucratic 
structure in which they are developed. In other words, by participating in this academy, I was 
exposed to a condensed version of the training that agents go through, which helped me further 
understand the cognitive models and rules that precede their decisions on the job. Also, I was 
exposed to the official ideology that the Border Patrol uses to describe itself to the public, which 
is an excellent indicator of what agents perceive as the moral basis of their coercive authority. 
Data Analysis 
All but one of the sixty interviews were audio recorded (one agent agreed to speak with 
me on the condition that I did not record his voice) and subsequently transcribed by a 
professional. I analyzed interview transcripts in two phases using HyperResearch, a qualitative 
data analysis software. First, I conducted inductive coding to take note of recurrent themes. This 
open coding phase generated a number of broad subjects that were very salient to agents. 
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Examples of these subjects are: “Use of Force”, “Empathetic Reactions”, “Accusations of 
Racism”, “Accusations of Abuse”. After creating these broad category groupings, I sorted these 
excerpts to analyze them by category. The second phase consisted of reading excerpts again to 
identify themes within these broad categories. I then created and applied focused codes to data 
excerpts based on my best estimation of the excerpt’s meaning (Wasserman, Clair, and Wilson 
2009). Throughout the analysis, I wrote analytic memos that allowed me to identify patterns in 
the data, examine hypothetical relationships between codes, and group codes into larger analytic 
domains. Over time, these memos began to form the contours of the findings narrative and 
eventually yielded the 4 empirical chapters that I present in the remainder of the dissertation.    
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter two reveals how Border Patrol agents sort migrants into different categories of 
deservingness and criminality. Their categorization schemas are a function of professional 
training in law enforcement procedures, as well as informal lessons that are passed on as war 
stories from agent to agent. Although agents recognize distinctions between different “types” of 
undocumented border crossers—distinctions that amount to a concession that not all migrants are 
criminals—at the point of arrest, these differences are obsolete. When making arrests, agents 
adhere to a self-protective logic, created and nourished through bureaucratic training that frames 
immigrants as essentially inscrutable and potentially dangerous. This premise that immigrants 
are inscrutable aliens justifies the United States’ punitive approach to immigration control, 
despite the fact that agents’ day-to-day work consists mostly of processing non-criminal aliens 
for immigration violations.  
Chapter three delves deeper into how Border Patrol agents reconcile the moral 
ambiguities that they experience on the job, especially in relation to migrants with morally 
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justifiable reasons for breaking immigration law. There are two ways that agents are forced to 
contend with the disjuncture between the security-based bureaucratic ideologies and the reality 
of their work: one-on-one interactions with deserving migrants, and public criticism of their 
work. I conceptualize these mechanisms as threats to their moral authority and analyze the 
narratives that agents deploy in response: criminalization as corrective, insecurity of immigrant 
identities, and caring control. The first two narratives dispute immigrants’ morality, while the 
last one draws on compassionate discourses to establish agents’ morality. Despite their varied 
substance, these narratives have a constant function: they allow agents to restore their moral 
authority and the legitimacy of the broader control apparatus they represent. In doing so, these 
legitimation narratives repair the normative foundation of agents’ work, allowing them to 
continue with an uncritical performance of their inherently exclusionary professional role.  
Chapter four provides a window into how Border Patrol agents reconcile tensions 
between their social group memberships and their professional role, by using Latino Border 
Patrol agents as a case study. I am particularly interested in whether Latino agents believe that 
their ethno-racial background impacts their work practices, especially since the bulk of their 
work targets are also Latinos. Findings show that these agents adopt two modes of 
professionalism: impartial professionalism negates the relevance of racial similarity between 
agents and immigrants, while compassionate professionalism embraces this similarity to improve 
the qualitative character of immigrants’ experiences with the bureaucracy. Regardless of agents’ 
preferred mode of professionalism, all Latino agents receive social sanctions for transgressing 
normative expectations of ethnic solidarity from immigrants and other co-ethnics. Therefore, my 
analysis also examines the symbolic boundaries they deploy in response to these social sanctions. 
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Overall, this chapter reveals both the promise and limitations of agents’ individual subjectivities 
and actions in creating a more compassionate immigration control system.  
Chapter five turns to the fundamental question of how Border Patrol agents understand, 
wield and justify their coercive power. Agents expressed a great deal of frustration and a distinct 
sense of persecution rooted in the public’s outcry against law enforcement agents’ excessive use 
of force. From the agents’ perspectives, the public is effectively disqualified from criticizing 
their force decisions, given their lack of experience with the high-pressure, dangerous situations 
they face, as well as their lack of familiarity with law enforcement training procedures. Agents’ 
sense of persecution heightens the solidarity among them and leads to a sense of fatalism when it 
comes to their force decisions. In other words, because agents feel that the political context is 
biased against them, their only recourse is to make use-of-force decisions based on their 
subjective sense of threat and instinct to survive.  I argue that the legal standard of 
“reasonableness” legitimizes agents’ instinctual approach to using force, because it creates a bias 
in favor of law enforcement agents’ perceptions when it comes to judging their decisions. 
Chapter six discusses the practical implications of having a police force be the primary 
managers of migration phenomena at the border, a site where a humanitarian approach is also 
warranted. I also highlight fruitful directions for future research, especially in the area of 
immigration discretion, procedural justice, and legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Inscrutable Aliens: 
Border Patrol Agents’ Categorization Schemes 
 
There are two conflicting public images of the Border Patrol—some portray it as a 
renegade bureaucracy with a de facto policy of abuse, while the government seeks to craft an 
image of a highly qualified law enforcement organization doing a complex job in a professional 
manner (Jones 2014). The occupational culture of Border Patrol agents is at the center of this 
debate, but we know little about how they make sense of their mandates and go about their work 
routines. This gap stifles our understanding of how border control is carried out on the ground.  
To address this gap, this chapter opens a window into Border Patrol agents’ occupational lives by 
revealing the largely implicit categorization schemes that shape their interactions with migrants.   
I focus on agents’ categorization schemas because as frontline workers, they face a basic 
paradox: how to systemize their work so that they can efficiently meet their mandates, while 
being responsive to variations as necessary (Lipsky 2010). This paradox is actually an outcome 
of bureaucratic rationality, which requires that policy implementers sort individuals into a set of 
discrete action categories to systematize their work and process large numbers of cases with 
scarce resources (Putnam and Mumby 1993). Bureaucrats use formal rules and informal 
judgments to sort people into types, which ultimately determines what benefit, service, or 
sanction a person is given (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Oberfield 2014). This process 
of categorization is morally loaded because it simultaneously exposes bureaucrats to individuals’ 
life circumstances and then forces them to do away with this human diversity in order to achieve 
their mandates in an efficient and prescribed manner (Hall 2010).  
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This process of turning diverse individuals into generic and by definition, dehumanized 
action categories is precisely what my analysis shows in this chapter. I demonstrate that Border 
Patrol agents perceive at least three distinct categories of migrants in their day-to-day work lives. 
For agents, these distinct migrants exist on a continuum of criminality so I order them from most 
to least criminal: “worst of the worst,” “labor migrants,” and “victims of circumstance.” At 
minimum, all of these people are subject to arrest for violating immigration law, but they 
represent different levels of danger for agents. However, instead of altering their behavior based 
on these levels of dangers, agents emphasize that they must treat all “aliens” with suspicion and 
with an emphasis on control.  This is so because according to them, fingerprinting (a post-arrest 
procedure), is the only foolproof way of determining which category a migrants belongs to.  
I refer to the cognitive model that frames migrants as inherently mysterious and therefore 
unpredictable and dangerous as the “inscrutable alien.” The inscrutable alien is the ideal-type 
migrant that agents described when discussing their work encounters. The basic logic behind this 
model is the following: Although not all people are bad (i.e. some are “just” labor migrants or 
victims of circumstance), agents cannot tell from just looking at them. Fingerprinting is the only 
way to determine a person’s level of criminality. Therefore, anyone encountered out in the desert 
should be treated as a if they are, or could be a dangerous criminal. Agent safety is always the 
number one priority. The inscrutable alien frame guides agents’ arrest decisions and qualitatively 
shapes their interactions with migrants. I argue that inscrutable alien frame is a product of their 
law enforcement culture and bureaucratic ideology. However, the particularities of Border Patrol 
work (i.e. agents are charged with “homeland security” and often patrol alone and in remote 
areas of the desert) exacerbates the level of danger agents perceive, and justifies this way of 
viewing immigrants.  
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Below, I document the development and function of the inscrutable alien frame. First, I 
provide a description of a typical work day to establish the context in which the frame develops. 
Then, I detail categories of people that agents can encounter during the course of their workday 
and show how the inscrutable alien frame creates a reliance on fingerprinting to determine what 
category a person belongs to. I provide examples of “war stories” that legitimize and reproduce 
the inscrutable alien frame and end by showing how this frame guides agents’ arrest procedures.  
Findings 
A Typical Day in the Desert: From Muster to Sign Cutting  
  Border Patrol agents “muster” at their station headquarters at the beginning of each shift. 
Muster is a briefing meeting1 led by supervisors where agents are informed of the prior shift’s 
activity (i.e. how many people came through, where they came through, whether there is 
evidence that a group entered, but has not been found, etc.) and are given their assignment. 
Assignments range from patrolling a remote area of the desert, a border city, or a highway, to 
“sitting on an X2,” being in charge of the “scope truck,” working a check point or the processing 
unit—these assignments are highly variable to prevent agent boredom and lessen the likelihood 
of corruption3. Most agents’ job narratives focus on desert patrol, a finding that is likely due to a 
combination of two factors: 1) in the sectors I studied, agents’ work experience may consist 
mostly of desert patrol, whereas other sectors’ work can be dominated by checkpoint 
assignments or city patrol; 2) agents perceive desert patrol as the prototype of Border Patrol 
work and emphasize it when describing their job to outsiders. My findings reflect agents’ 
emphasis on this type of work, but it is important that future research examine how distinct 
assignments impact agents’ categorization schemas.  
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Agents pick up their weapons at the armory immediately after muster. Border Patrol 
agents have extensive weapons training, but they are issued distinct weapons based on the type 
of assignment they have been given for the day. For instance, agents assigned to roving patrol in 
a border city may carry only the standard handgun on their belt, while those that are assigned to 
remote areas of the desert will carry long rifles in addition to their standard gun. Next, agents 
check their vehicles (to make sure they have gas, tire air, etc.) and head out to their assigned 
area. Many will stop at a local gas station for coffee, water, and snacks on their way to their 
assigned zone. This is how the average 8- to 12-hour desert patrol shift usually begins.  
 “Sign cutting” is a critical part of what agents assigned to desert areas do on their shift. It 
consists of looking for disturbances in the environment—mostly footprints, but also minuscule 
details like moisture on overturned rocks, clothing fibers on vegetation, or branches broken off 
desert brush. Border Patrol agents are proud of their sign cutting skills and the agents 
interviewed often discussed the history of this tracking method (i.e. Native Americans), 
highlighting the fact that despite technological advances in border control, “sign cutting is still 
the patrol’s bread and butter.” Agents can tell from the sign’s characteristics roughly how many 
people have entered, whether it is a mixed group (men, women, and children) or mostly men, 
how long ago they entered, and which direction they are heading. 
 Once an agent has “cut a group,” they follow a standard protocol that consists of calling 
in the sign to a supervisor, giving him/her the sign’s description (i.e. a literal description of the 
shoe print, when visible, since crossers often attach sponges and other material to the bottom of 
their shoe to disguise their sign) and the sign’s coordinates. As one agent told me, “cutting a 
group is where the chase begins.” This is what an agent looks forward to on his/her shift—
identifying that a group of people has entered the country in their area. Agents often describe the 
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chase as a fun game of “cat and mouse” or “hide and seek with guns” and enlist their colleagues 
in a time-saving strategy they call “leapfrogging” to see how far the group has gotten. In 
leapfrogging, the agent who has identified the sign asks another agent who is stationed in the 
direction where the sign is headed to see if they can identify it in their area. If they can, then the 
original agent can drive over to that location quickly having “leapfrogged” an entire area of land; 
they continue doing this until they either lose the sign or find the group.  
 When agents transition from discussing sign-cutting to “coming up on the group,” 
portrayals of their job turn from mundane description to an ominous narrative about impending 
threat and danger. This darker portrayal of the job emerges out of one important factor: agents 
never know who they are tracking through the desert. While it could be labor migrants who are 
usually highly compliant, the group could also be armed cartel members, or a combination of 
criminally-inclined individuals. As a result, when agents finally find the group they have been 
tracking, many times for hours and over several shifts, it is a moment of great satisfaction, but 
also a moment of high stress where their priority is their own safety.  
Categories of Migrants: From the Worst of the Worst to the Victims of Circumstance 
From the perspective of Border Patrol agents, everyone they encounter in the desert4 is 
technically a criminal because they have broken immigration law by entering the United States 
unlawfully between ports of entry. As lawbreakers, they are all subject to arrest without 
exception. In that sense, the mission is straightforward, as this male agent with 9 years of 
experience explains: “The job, it’s simple. You’re there to catch somebody. So that would 
probably be the easiest part. Simplicity in what you’re doing. ‘Cause whatever is coming across 
the border…if they’re coming across that line, you have to apprehend them.”  
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Although agents describe their mission in black and white terms, they do make nuanced 
distinctions between categories of people that they encounter while on the job. There are three 
categories of migrants that dominate agents’ discourse, and I have ordered them from most to 
least criminal and labeled them descriptively: the worst of the worst, labor migrants, and the 
victims of circumstance. Before describing these categories, however, it is important to clarify 
that agents rely on a fingerprint database during the post-arrest processing procedures to 
determine which category a person belongs to. Therefore, these categories do not come into 
focus until after a person has been arrested and fingerprinted. During the initial encounter and 
arrest procedures, it is the inscrutable alien frame (which holds that migrants are hard to read and 
potentially criminal/dangerous) that dominates agents’ perceptions of and interactions with them.   
Appendix C, Table 3 describes the categories of migrants that agents encounter at work. 
The categories are mostly discrete, but when people move from one category to another (mostly 
from the victims of circumstance category to worst of the worst category), it serves as a lesson 
for agents that “you can’t trust anybody.” Agents also assign a frequency of interaction to these 
categories (except for victims of circumstance) and discuss them in terms of criminality and the 
amount of satisfaction or social status they get from arresting them.  
The Worst of the Worst. This category looms large in agent discourse and is the most 
criminal. This category includes drug and human smugglers, murderers, gang members, 
pedophiles and rapists, and terrorists. According to agents, many of the people in this category 
have committed heinous crimes in the United States, have served time in prison and been 
deported, and are now trying to get back into the country undetected because they cannot go 
through ports of entry. The drug smugglers are dangerous because they work for Transnational 
Crime Organizations (TCOs or cartels), are armed, and have much to lose if their drug load is 
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intercepted. Human smugglers are portrayed as “heartless” and “with no regard for human life” 
and are often grouped with TCOs. Agents specify that they have never actually caught a terrorist, 
but this is always a possibility. As law enforcement professionals, agents get the most social 
status from catching this category of migrant because they represent the real bad guys. Still, 
agents admit that this is category represents the minority of people that they apprehend on a day-
to-day basis.  
Labor Migrants. This category represents the majority of people agents apprehend. 
Agents infer that an arrestee is most likely a labor migrant when their record is made up of 
multiple immigration violations and sometimes, minor offenses (e.g. traffic tickets) in the United 
States. Labor migrants represent a run-of-the-mill arrest for agents; they get less 
satisfaction/social status from catching this type of person than the worst of the worst. However, 
they do recognize that immigration violations are an important part of the Border Patrol’s 
historic and contemporary mission, so they feel good about preventing this type of person from 
entering the country. A person can move out of this category to the worst of the worst category if 
they have been arrested for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Some agents talk 
about this category in empathetic terms, recognizing that many of them “just want to feed their 
families,” but return to the idea that “there is a right way of doing it.”  
Victims of Circumstance. This is the category of people agents do not want to interact 
with. They are the least criminal, and dealing with them represents a social service/humanitarian-
type chore that is the farthest from the law enforcement mission that motivates them. They are 
also most likely to provoke emotional dilemmas, often because agents “feel bad” for the children 
(who often remind them of their own children) or the women (especially given the risk of sexual 
assault in crossing). Older men and especially submissive men crossing with their families also 
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fit within this category. Notably, the view of “victims of circumstance” men contrasts starkly 
with how agents depict men in the other two categories: able-bodied and cunning.  
The Emergence of the Inscrutable Alien: You Don’t Know ‘Em ‘Till You Roll ‘Em  
 Agents recognize that there are distinct categories of immigration violators and concede 
that they are “not all bad,” reserving their revulsion for the worst of the worst. However, they 
stress that when they are out in the desert, sign-cutting or responding to a sensor, they cannot tell 
who they are dealing with. This is how the inscrutable alien becomes so significant in agents’ 
perceptions and behaviors. The inscrutable alien frame blurs the boundaries between categories 
of migrants that agents know exist, and creates an ideal-type “alien” that is hard to read and 
therefore dangerous. It creates a reliance on a post-arrest procedure, “rolling” arrestees’ 
fingerprints through the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). The 
IAFIS is an FBI biometric database that returns a profile of the person’s criminal record, if they 
have one. Since fingerprinting is the only fool-proof way of ascertaining what category a person 
belongs to, agents must arrest everyone to avoid letting a criminal go free. The following male 
agent, who has 11 years of experience with the Border Patrol, explains:  
…The normal agent tracking a person through the desert, you can’t distinguish. When 
you start following a group of people, if you could tell me who to follow, if you could tell 
me, you know what? By looking at his footstep, this guy has an AK-47 and he’s bringing 
drugs into the country. And then this guy has no criminal history and is coming in to pick 
apples in Washington. I’m gonna go after the guy with the AK-47…but we can’t 
distinguish that when we’re tracking them through the desert. Not until you apprehend 
them and you take them to the station and you roll their fingerprints do you know who 
they are. 
 
This agent clarifies that if he could distinguish the footprint of the worst of the worst from the 
labor migrant category, he would pursue the former. This highlights a common pattern among 
agents: they stress that their priority is to prevent the real bad guys from entering the country. 
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However, as it is not possible to do this, agents have to arrest everyone—even if the eventual 
fingerprinting procedure shows them to be members of the least criminal categories.  
In fact, many agents recognize that most migrants do not have criminal records that 
would place them in the worst of the worst category. However, even though agents recognize 
that the most criminal category of migrant is the numerical minority, this statistical reality does 
not delegitimize the inscrutable alien frame, because agents do not know who they are dealing 
with until they fingerprint them. The following quote illustrates a common pattern in agent 
narratives, a certain oscillation between recognizing that criminals are the minority, and 
clarifying that they do exist.  
We do get a lot of people with criminal histories and I’m not saying it’s a majority. It is a 
minority that we get people with criminal histories. Anything from burglaries to child 
abuse to murder. And we do get a lot of people, but most people don’t have a criminal 
history…  
 
This back and forth the agent has with himself illustrates an awareness of the incongruence 
between their professional mission as law enforcement agents and the actual flow of people that 
they encounter as they patrol the border. That is, as law enforcement professionals, their job is to 
protect the American people from a variety of dangerous subjects—drug and human smugglers, 
violent criminals, and sexual predators. But they concede that their everyday work consists 
mostly of processing people who have broken the law (and are therefore subject to arrest), but 
are not the real bad guys. This is evidenced by the fact that labor migrants figure prominently as 
a reference group for the various examples that agents cite for the worst of the worst category. 
The following male agent with 7 years of experience demonstrates this finding: 
The main threat at the border I would probably say is obviously the whole terrorism 
thing. I’m not discounting that but we don’t see it enough or we’re not seeing it at all so 
just the five percent of illegal aliens that come across that aren’t coming across for better 
work, they’re the major threat. 
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This agent mentions terrorism as an indefinite threat, even though it is the Border Patrol’s 
priority mission since 9/11. Most significantly, he also acknowledges that criminals are the 
numerical minority, far outnumbered by migrants who are attempting to improve their lives. 
Nevertheless, the criminal alien is the default type of migrant that agents’ arrest procedures and 
training is based on. Therefore, agents are taught to prioritize their own safety by assuming that 
any or all immigrants are potentially dangerous.  
 The inscrutable alien frame is also used to justify agents’ use of force. Border Patrol 
shootings have received a great deal of attention and are salient for agents, as evidenced by the 
fact that most discussed this topic without any prompting. At its core, the argument that agents 
make to justify use of force is that their priority is their own safety, and that they do not know 
who they are dealing with out in the desert. This agent with 9 years of experience contrasts 
agents’ intimate (and therefore legitimate) understanding of the dangers of the job with the 
public’s uniformed perspectives.    
Like if something happened, they (the media and the public) is always attacking the 
government. Border patrol this, border patrol did that. And they don’t know why we did 
it. They think everybody that comes across is a saint. They’re not. They don’t know that 
we deal with people that we don’t know who they are. That we’re going to be in the 
middle of nowhere by ourselves. We’ve got to do what we’ve got to do. 
 
This suggests that agents’ framing of their job as dangerous and of migrants as inscrutable may 
have the ultimate consequence for people trying to enter the U.S. between ports of entry, no 
matter what “objective” category they belong to. As with other law enforcement professions, 
use-of-force decisions are largely a matter of agents’ subjective feelings of threat—which may 
not be grounded in what the “subject” is doing, as much as the combination of social categories 
(i.e. race/ethnicity and gender) they embody.   
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War Stories: How the Inscrutable Alien Frame is Reproduced and Legitimized 
Learning to see migrants as inscrutable is a process that happens over time through on-
the-job socialization5. For the agents of the Border Patrol, the inscrutable alien is the ideal-type 
migrant that guides their actions; this preventative approach is understood as a way to keep 
themselves safe. Although this frame gives agents a set of general tenets (e.g. you can’t trust 
anyone, fingerprints are the only way to figure them out, safeguard yourself because they are 
unpredictable), these tenets then have to be solidified into a set of rules. Specifically, agents must 
learn to “not to judge a book by its cover” because the worst of the worst could be lurking behind 
or within someone who appears to belong to one of the other less/non-criminal categories. In 
fact, trying to distinguish between migrants before arrest is a liability to agents’ safety and a sign 
of inexperience and naiveté.  
This is where personal experiences of encountering someone that almost deceived them 
serve as important lessons for agents themselves and “war stories6” that they share with others. 
Research with law enforcement trainees has demonstrated that stories of insiders’ personal 
experiences with “bad guys” are regarded as valid, and trainees are highly receptive to them 
(Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010). Among this study’s respondents, these war stories often 
center on deceitful women who turned out to be criminals; it is critical that these stories center 
on women7 because the often exemplify the vulnerability of the victims of circumstance 
category. These stories are memorable because they disrupt agents’ assumptions about victims of 
circumstance, but also instructive because they teach new agents and confirm for experienced 
agents that they should not trust anyone before they are fingerprinted. Some of these stories also 
serve to thwart the compassion that agents feel for certain people. Below, I quote at length from 
two interviews that exemplify the types of war stories that agents told me.   
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“The Grandma,” Male Agent with 9 years of experience 
 
…this is what really opened my eyes. I was just a trainee at the time. I pull it [a vehicle] 
over, go up and talk to the driver. I'm talking to the driver and she's basically a spitting 
image of my grandma. Not so much the face but close. She's speaking to me like my 
grandma would, real sweet, real nice, whatever. I ask her if she had any documents. No. 
Still being really nice, really sweet. Passenger? Nothing. Right. And as I'm telling her to 
turn it [engine] off, the guy [agents’ field training officer] in the back's like 'turn off the 
vehicle, grab the keys!’, and I'm like, ‘what? I know they're wet’. And he goes ‘no, there's 
bodies in the back’. And so I look. And under one of the trash bags, you can see a foot 
sticking out. So we open it up and there's two guys that are hiding under the back. So we 
get them all, we take them to the station.  
 
And this lady, I'm processing her, and she's still sweet, she's still nice. And I roll 
[fingerprint] her. And she comes back for heroin smuggling, cocaine smuggling, 
marijuana smuggling. Not just personal use but big amounts and everything else. She's 
been busted for anything and everything. And she has a rap that's longer than you are 
standing up. And I'm just like oh my God. You know? Well, what would she do to not get 
caught? I don't know. I don't know. But at the time, at the stop, I was like, this sweet old 
lady. You know, she's been steered wrong. Then I saw this and I'm like no she's not. She's 
dirty. And so from that point on, you don't trust anybody. You don't trust anyone until you 
roll them. It just, it put me in a completely different mindset. And luckily that happened to 
me early on.  
 
From this agent’s perspective, the moral of the story is that appearances can be misleading and 
that no-one can be trusted. Experiences such as this one justify and reproduce the inscrutable 
alien frame by teaching agents that the only reliable way to ascertain a person’s identity is 
through fingerprinting. In fact, even agents’ own gut feelings about a person can be distorted, as 
evidenced by this agents’ sense that this woman who reminded him of his grandmother was 
essentially a good person that had been steered wrong. Ultimately, the agent was grateful that 
this happened early in his career, because it taught him an important lesson that he would apply 
in subsequent experiences. It is important to note that this encounter happened during a traffic 
stop. This is significant, because most agents interviewed instead cite experiences that occurred 
in the desert, but this one suggests that the inscrutable alien frame is part of the larger normative 
structure that operates regardless of agents’ specific assignment. 
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The following story, which was recounted to me by another agent with 9 years of 
experience, also occurred early in his career. Like the story told by the previous agent, it seems 
that the experience taught him skepticism, but it also served to thwart his compassion for people 
he encountered during the course of his work. It involves a woman he arrested out in the desert; 
she provoked sympathy in the agent, but turned out to be a wanted murderer.  
“The Turning-Point,” Male Agent with 9 years of experience 
 
R: At first, I really felt bad for a while. It was one of those things where it was like ‘oh my 
God, this person, they're just trying to make their living. They just want a better life for 
themselves’. But on that same note, you find out that there's liars really quick. And you 
get better at being able to figure out who's full of shit and who's actually genuine.  
 
I: Is there anyone that stands out that you've contacted out in the desert? 
 
R: I think for me, one of the, when I realized how bad people could be, I was new. I was 
off of the field-training unit. I was basically out in the field by myself….A group set the 
sensors off and I caught up to them and arrested them. And I remember clear as day, it 
was a group of five. Two women, three guys. And two of the guys were saying that one of 
the women were (sic) their sister….  
 
And she was begging me, begging me to let her go. ‘Please, please, please, my mother 
just passed away. That's the only reason I went back. I went back because I wanted to see 
her before she passed away’…And she's like, ‘now my husband's sick and I just want to 
get back to him, in the hospital’… And the two guys were like ‘let her go, let her go. We 
won't give you any trouble if you just let her go’. And I’m like, ‘oh my God’. And the 
woman is bawling her eyes out, just crying like crazy… She's begging me the whole time, 
just crying her eyes out.  
 
Finally I tell her, “look, I'm sorry. But I have to do what I have to do. Just like you're 
trying to do what you have to do. If I let you go and somebody else catches you, I'm fired. 
And I know you're not going to feed my kids like I'm not going to feed your kids. I'm 
really sorry but I can't just let you go.” So I put them in the truck and everything and I 
get all their information. I went into processing at the end of the night… She's sitting 
there, her and her supposed brothers. She was wanted for murder. I'm sorry, attempted 
murder. All three of them plotted to kill the husband.  
 
I think for me that was honestly like a turning point. Because I honestly felt bad for them. 
I felt really bad for her. But it was just one of those things where I just can't. And thank 
God I didn't. But. So. That for me was a turning point, I guess. 
 
I: What was the turning point?  
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R: It kind of opened my eyes. Yeah, there's a lot of good people out there. There's a lot of 
people just trying to make a better life for themselves. But there's a lot of good liars out 
there too. 
 
In this case, the moral of the story is similar to the previous one: agents do not know who they 
are dealing with until their fingerprints are returned. However, it has the added element of 
helping this agent cope with the fact that he was “feeling bad for a while” because he was 
serving as a gatekeeper for people who had noble goals—to feed their family and make a better 
life for themselves in the U.S. This experience is a “turning point” that occurred early in his 
career. It is important to note that he suggests that agents “get better at being able to figure out 
who's full of shit and who's actually genuine,” suggesting that these experiences teach agents 
valuable work skills to distinguish between types of people. However, my research suggests that 
these experiences teach agents to be suspicious of all people, rather than teaching them 
deciphering skills.  
These stories, which agents specify happened early on in their career, legitimize and 
reproduce the image of the inscrutable alien. They also demonstrate that agents have to learn the 
inscrutable alien frame on the job. Finally, these types of experiences also teach agents that they 
have to prioritize their own safety, because danger lurks in the most unexpected places.  
Encountering the Inscrutable Alien: Arrest and Processing Procedures 
  
Since the inscrutable alien is unpredictable, a sense of threat and danger dominates 
agents’ encounters with him. Furthermore, few people cross the border alone, so agents usually 
encounter groups that range from a handful of people to large groups. When agents encounter a 
group, safety is their priority; they have to control the situation by ensuring that everyone is 
compliant and that they cannot run or hurt the agent. During these encounters, “officer presence” 
or “command presence” is of utmost importance. Officer/command presence is an important 
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concept in law enforcement and its basic premise is that “bad guys” are less likely to comply 
with an officer’s orders if they perceive him/her as weak. Non-compliance is considered a safety 
hazard to the officer (and the public) because it can escalate a situation and raise the stakes for 
the use of force. As law enforcement professionals, Border Patrol agents are taught to assert 
themselves by giving orders in a way that projects authority, power, and control. 
 In combination, the perception of the inscrutable alien and official training in 
command/officer presence seems to level the treatment that people will encounter from the 
Border Patrol out in the field. That is, agents assume that anyone they encounter during the 
course of an arrest poses either an immediate danger to themselves and/or an impending danger 
to the American people. As such, agents consistently described arrest procedures that center on 
asserting control over the group to protect their own safety.  
Once they have visually located a group, agents prefer tactical setups that take advantage 
of the element of surprise. Agent prefer to set up in locations where the group either walks right 
up to them or where they can sneak up on the group from behind. Taking advantage of the 
element of surprise, agents assertively order people to sit down in a line with their legs in a V 
and ask them to take a shoe or their shoelaces off; this prevents them from running. 
Simultaneously, the agent is positioning him/herself behind everyone so that they cannot see 
him/her, but he can see all of them. The agent watches for behavioral cues to identify potential 
“trouble-makers” or people who seem less compliant or likely to rebel. If there is one, they 
handcuff him (all examples are of trouble-making men) to make an example of him and prevent 
him from getting the rest of the group to “buck up.” The next step is to search each person 
individually, looking for weapons to confiscate. Searching is not to be done alone. Therefore, by 
this time, agents are always accompanied by their backup, if they were not already together when 
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they encountered the group. Basic demographics are taken at this juncture, but these data are 
viewed with skepticism. Depending on the location of the arrest, either a transport vehicle will 
pick up the arrestees or the agent will transport them to the station for processing. At the 
processing center8, agents generate a file for each arrestee through extensive one-on-one 
interviews and the all-important fingerprinting moment. Processing is critical, not only because it 
represents the moment when the actual identity of arrestees come into focus for agents, but also 
because legal consequences are applied at this juncture.  
Discussion 
This chapter examines Border Patrol agents’ categorization schemes and provides a 
description of their work. I demonstrate that while agents perceive distinct categories of 
undocumented migrants, they ultimately adhere to a protective logic that frames all immigrants 
as inscrutable aliens—people who are inherently hard to read and potentially dangerous.  
I argue that the inscrutable alien frame teaches agents to disregard heterogeneity among migrants 
and to assume that they are all potentially criminal or dangerous from the initial point of 
encounter to the arrest. This frame, which emerges from a combination of general law 
enforcement norms and the particularities of immigration enforcement work, serves four 
intricately-related functions: 1) it allows agents to reconcile the gap between their professional 
ideals and their actual work; 2) it thwarts agents’ compassion for certain migrants; 3) it stifles the 
possibility that agents will exercise arrest discretion; and 4) it justifies the use of force. 
First, by perceiving migrants as inscrutable and therefore potentially dangerous, agents 
reconcile the gap between their professional ideals and the reality of their day-to-day work. As 
members of a law enforcement profession, agents derive the most satisfaction and social status 
from catching criminals. However, most of what they do on a daily basis consists of processing 
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people for immigration violations. This particular set of agents were working during the Obama 
administration, which they perceived as anti-border control. By holding on to the possibility that 
the worst of the worst are lurking in unexpected places, agents keep open the possibility that real 
police work is always on the horizon. This keeps them motivated to do a job where they feel 
misunderstood by the public, attacked by the media, and unsupported by their leaders.   
Second, this frame also thwarts agents’ compassion for certain migrants. Most agents 
recognize that not everyone who crosses the border without documentation belongs to the “worst 
of the worst” category. Yes, they are all immigration violators and subject to arrest, but not all of 
them are “bad.” Some agents will go so far as to empathize with some border crossers, especially 
victims of circumstance and some labor migrants, stating that they would do the same if they 
were in their position. However, constant empathy for people they are charged with excluding 
would make Border Patrol agents’ job very difficult and perhaps unbearable. Consequently, the 
notion that aliens are inscrutable (until they are fingerprinted) allows them to make arrests based 
on the possibility that they are dealing with a criminal, not a person whose law-breaking is 
morally justifiable.   
Third, the inscrutable alien frame keeps agents from exercising arrest discretion9. Here 
the frame works in combination with the paramilitary organizational culture of the USBP. Built 
into law enforcement training is a very strict set of rules, structured chains of command, an 
emphasis on seniority for decision-making power, and a constant threat of discipline for 
diverging from rules (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010). Therefore, it is unlikely that most well-
socialized line agents, who are usually at the bottom of the command ladder, would exercise 
arrest discretion even without this frame. Nevertheless, agents often work alone, far from the 
purview of their peers or supervisors; this grants them the type of autonomy that could lead them 
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to veer away from protocols. By emphasizing the possibility that agents could be letting a 
heinous criminal go free, the inscrutable alien frame minimizes their discretion in this area.  
 The final function of this frame is to justify the use of force when agents feel threatened. 
Agents argue that the media and public perceive Border Patrol shootings as unjustified. 
According to agents, the public interprets their use of force as excessive, because they 
mistakenly perceive all migrants as labor migrants or victims of circumstance. However, agents 
argue, there are also bad people—criminals crossing the border—and agents cannot easily 
distinguish between good and bad people. As a result, agents may resort to the use of force to 
protect themselves from inscrutable aliens when they feel threatened.   
I argue that the inscrutable alien frame is a function of the intersection of law 
enforcement norms, immigration politics, and the relationship between bureaucrats and the 
public. Law enforcement training emphasizes the dangers of the job and inculcates skepticism 
and suspicion, presenting them as important skills to keep officers safe (Paoline 2004). This 
training creates a state of mind where law enforcement officials are highly suspicious of the 
public and may perceive danger to be lurking even in the most unexpected places. Therefore, the 
idea that migrants are hard to read resonates with the discourses that city cops use to describe the 
public as inherently untrustworthy (Cockcroft 2013). U.S. immigration politics also frame 
undocumented immigrants as untrustworthy and undeserving (Heyman 2009). Therefore, the 
inscrutable alien frame is a product of the skepticism that law enforcement culture nurtures as a 
source of officer safety, compounded by the distanced relationship between immigrants and 
immigration bureaucrats.    
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  1	  The meeting is held in a large room, with chairs and long desks organized classroom-style, 
facing a wall-sized white board and podium. 
 
2 These are stationary positions in high traffic areas. These are some of the most dreaded 
assignments, because agents cannot leave their position for their entire shift (at least 8 hours).  
 
3 Agents explained that Transnational Crime Organizations are “always watching” the USBP, so 
their strategy of switching people around lessens the likelihood that these organizations will 
infiltrate the organization by threatening agents or paying them off. Also, keeping assignments 
variable prevents the cartels from learning a particular agent’s routines.  
 
4 Agents focused on those who enter between ports of entry. However, agents who had 
experience at checkpoints or who had done highway stops also mentioned visa overstayers. Next 
steps include examining how agents’ perceptions/treatment may differ based on mode of 
entrance. 
 
5 It is likely that this frame is also a product of official training, since being suspicious and 
skeptical of the public is a “skill” that police officers develop in order to preserve their own 
safety. See Paoline, Eugene A. 2004. "Shedding Light on Police Culture: An Examination of 
Officers' Occupational Attitudes." Police Quarterly 7:205-236.. 
 
6 Other stories agents often told me were 1) about memorable men that belong to the worst of the 
worst category, mostly drug and human smugglers but often MS-13 members; and 2) empathetic 
stories about people in the victims of circumstance category. 
 
7 A similar phenomenon occurs with teenagers. Although teenagers technically belong to the 
least criminal category, they are often portrayed as smugglers and rock throwers to drive home 
the point that anyone (even children) could pose a threat to agents’ safety.  
 
8 The processing station is a very large space with an elevated command center encircled by tall 
windows. This center is outfitted with multiple screens corresponding to the surveillance 
cameras that are pointed toward and into the cells where arrestees wait their turn for processing. 
Grey cinder blocks and metal are the most visible materials in the station, making it very cold 
and generating a great deal of echo. The arrestees wait their turn to be processed inside the cells; 
there are separate cells for family units, women with children, and single men. At one point, 
agents processed the people they arrested (referring to this practice as “cleaning what you 
catch”), but today that is no longer the case at this sector. Therefore, the agents who are 
processing arrestees are usually not the arresting agent.  
 
9 It is difficult to confirm that agents do not exercise arrest discretion out in the field. My sense is 
that discretion is very low, especially for line agents given the USBP paramilitary organization 
culture and the inscrutable alien frame. However, it is also important to note that agents have 
little incentive to admit that they have let someone go. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
We’re the Good Guys: 
Cultivating A Moral Authority 
 
 
The question of whether it is moral, fair, or just to stop citizens of one country from 
entering another—especially when they are fleeing persecution or otherwise seeking to improve 
their lives—centers on humanitarian ideals (Ticktin 2006). As argued by Dauvergne (1999)  
humanitarianism “sums up the emotional appeal of “give us your huddled masses” and defines 
our willingness to share our prosperity” (p. 620); it is therefore viewed as a core tenet of “fair” 
immigration law in Western democracies. Yet, immigration laws are also inherently exclusive 
since they define the boundaries between who is fit to enter and remain in a territory and who is 
not (Tichenor 2002). As such, the job of those who enforce immigration law is to sort people into 
the legal categories of admissible and inadmissible. In this sorting process, state actors often 
learn about individuals’ life circumstances and this exposure to the humanity of aliens has the 
potential to generate moral dilemmas (Heyman 2000; Mountz 2010). These moral dilemmas 
often come in the form of emotional reactions, instances of empathy (or distanced, but genuine 
sympathy) for immigrants’ plight (Eggebø 2012; Graham 2002; Hall 2010).  
Indeed, crime and terrorism-based rhetoric aside, modern migration flows throughout the 
world consist largely of people fleeing persecution, poverty, wars, and other hardships (Pallister-
Wilkins 2015). The United States’ southern border is no exception to this global trend. As 
reported by the Department of Homeland Security, “The great majority (95 percent) of (…) 
removals of non-criminal immigration violators were individuals encountered by CBP agents 
and officers at or near the border or ports of entry.” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
2015: 6). Or, as one agent aptly put it, “Ninety percent of people you catch are people that want 
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to find a better way of life, they want to build for their kids.” Therefore, regardless of Border 
Patrol agents’ socialization as homeland protectors who are fighting against a variety of 
criminals (Jones 2014), their daily work consists of implementing punitive policies on a 
heterogeneous group of people—most of whom are economic migrants and, recently, asylum-
seeking families.  
This gap between their professionalization as law enforcers and the reality of their daily 
work requires reconciliation, because it creates moral ambiguity for agents, but also because the 
United States’ crime-based approach to managing migration is the source of much public 
scrutiny (Ewing, Martinez, and Rumbaut 2015). Moral dilemmas that agents experience 
personally, like the organization’s reputational problems, constitute external threats to agents’ 
occupational identity and their moral authority, both of which are founded on the boundary 
between “good guys” (agents) and “bad guys” (criminals). Without the “bad guys,” agents’ sense 
of mission is disrupted.  
This chapter examines the narratives through which agents restore their moral authority, 
especially when they are forced to reconcile the gap between the ideology of immigrant 
criminality and the demographic reality of immigration flows. I find that there are two primary 
mechanisms that challenge agents’ moral authority. First, agents’ personal interactions with non-
criminal migrants whose harrowing border-crossing experiences remind them of the poverty, 
persecution, and related issues of global inequality that underlie human migration. I refer to this 
category of border crossers as “deserving migrants” because agents concede that they have 
morally justifiable reasons for breaking immigration law and that they deserve compassion, if not 
a legal break. Second, legitimacy issues become salient through agents’ interactions with the 
public, which includes their personal networks and the media. The public’s view of their work 
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reminds agents of the USBP’s reputational issues and exposes them to criticism. Notably, much 
of this criticism centers on the question of compassion for deserving migrants.  
Agents deploy three distinct, albeit highly interrelated narratives to repair this legitimacy 
deficit: criminalization as corrective, insecurity of immigrant identities, and caring control. The 
first two narratives dispute immigrants’ morality, while the last one draws on compassionate 
discourses to establish agents’ morality. The first narrative, “criminalization as corrective,” 
argues that that the moral character of undocumented migrants has changed over time. That is, 
the pious economic migrants who came to the U.S. to make a better life for their family—
migrants who deserved compassion—have been replaced by heinous criminals. The second 
narrative, “insecurity of immigrant identities,” allows agents to concede that most undocumented 
migrants are not criminals. However, it maintains that agents are justified in treating all 
immigrants alike, as if they were criminals, because agents never know. Therefore, the core of 
this narrative is that migrants’ identities are inscrutable, at least until they are fingerprinted in the 
post-arrest processing unit. The third narrative, “caring control,” allows agents to establish their 
moral authority, not by disputing migrants’ morality but by citing examples of agents acting 
empathetically toward their subjects. I call this caring control because agents try to improve the 
qualitative character of migrants’ custodial experience without altering their legal penalties.  
Despite the varied substance of these narratives, their function is constant—they allow 
agents to restore their moral authority and the legitimacy of the broader control apparatus they 
represent. In doing so, these legitimation narratives repair the normative foundation for agents’ 
compliance with their professional mandates. This legitimacy allows agents to continue doing 
their job, as prescribed by the bureaucracy, even when they experience cognitive dissonance or 
emotional dilemmas in doing so.  
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Findings 
Criminalization as a Corrective: “We used to get workers, but it’s different now” 
 
Since the existence of deserving migrants is a major challenge to agents’ moral authority, 
agents use the “criminalization” narrative to issue a corrective about migrants’ moral character. 
Through this narrative, agents frame undocumented migrants as heinous criminals, especially by 
highlighting deportees who have been expelled from the U.S. for committing a crime. Here, 
agents rely on an argument about temporal change, claiming that economic migrants used to 
dominate migration flows, but have now been replaced by felons.  
Agents draw on readily-available discourses on immigrant criminality to emphasize the 
importance of border control. For the following agent, the job is not simply about enforcing the 
country’s laws—it is about protecting her family from dangerous elements.  
Everybody assumed, and I get this a lot, a lot of people assume that people coming from 
the border are coming here to work. It used to be that way, absolutely. I met a lot of good 
people on the border or in the desert that come here and do want to work. But I’ve met far 
too many rapists, smugglers, drug traffickers, sex trafficking, murderers, you name it. 
And it’s like no, I don’t want those people here. I have kids. I gotta worry about my 
children too. It’s a common misconception in the general public because of media that 
we’re just out to catch poor little Juanita who wants to come here and work. And that’s 
not the case. – Latina, 8 years of experience 
 
 Note that this agent relies on a temporal argument to comment on migrants’ changing 
moral character. She concedes that she has met “a lot of good people” who cross into the United 
States for employment, but she argues that the traffic has changed. That is, “it used to be” that 
the bulk of unauthorized border crossers were economic migrants, but that is no longer the case. 
Now the traffic consists of sex offenders, human traffickers, and drug smugglers—people who 
committed crimes that resulted in their deportation from the U.S. 
  The perception that traffic has changed over time from economic migrants to people with 
criminal records is commonly held by agents. The following representative quotes demonstrate:  
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Back when I started, ninety-five percent of people were good ol’ boys coming in… The 
newer generation seems to be, at least here in this area, a lot of prior criminals. Guys that 
were in jail. Guys that were criminals up north somewhere and got jailed for whatever 
reason, identified through ICE. Hey, you know what, this guy’s not even legal. Kick him 
out. And now they’re trying to come back. – Latino, 17 years of experience 
 
Back in the day, you got the ones that want to work. Nowadays, we get the, you know, 
the child molesters. It’s not like it used to be. Now they don’t care, they want to fight 
you. They’re drug smugglers. They have some kind of criminal history. It’s not like 
before. –Latina, 12 years of experience 
 
Although people with criminal records (not including repeated immigration violations) are a 
minority of removals (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2015) this perception among 
agents may be a function of the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, along 
with emergence of biometric databases that link immigration records with FBI criminal 
repositories. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) reclassify a number of 
misdemeanors and non-aggravated felonies as “aggravated felonies” for immigration purposes, 
which sets the stage for the increase in deportations seen in the post 9/11 era (Dowling and Inda 
2013). Many of the deported are individuals with family ties in the United States (Hagan, 
Rodriguez, and Castro 2011) who then attempt to re-enter. When they are apprehended by 
Border Patrol agents, biometric databases link deportees’ fingerprints with their criminal record 
in the United States. The consequence in terms of how agents experience “traffic” is that they 
perceive an increase in the criminality of undocumented border crossers, when they are actually 
witnessing the repercussions of policy changes.  However, the idea that there is a qualitative 
change in the character of immigrants may also be part of the organizational logic of the U.S. 
immigration bureaucracy. Heyman’s (2000) study of INS officers also showed that “officers 
consistently asserted that migrants were better behaved in the past, no matter when that past was 
for the particular officer” (p. 641).  
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The following quote further demonstrates how agents issue a corrective about 
immigrants’ moral character. Notably, in this case, the narrative is deployed in direct response to 
the agent’s admission that many people have harrowing experiences trying to cross into the 
United States. Responding to my question about whether there are particularly memorable 
people or stories that he has encountered while in the field, he first recounts a story of a young 
girl who had been “abused, tortured” so her hands were “cut up bad” making it almost 
impossible to fingerprint her. He ends that story telling me that the children usually stand out in 
his mind and then continues with the following experience about a single mom who was 
traveling with her son.  
R: …she comes through. And it’s an all-male group. And they just crossed. And she’s 
got—what was weird about her, she had a pocket full of condoms. Like fifty of them. 
And for us, we were, when we’re questioning her, we're like “Why the condoms? You’ve 
got your son with you. Do you really want to do that kind of business with your son 
around?” She said “No, but I know I will be raped. I knew I was going to be probably 
raped by this group. At the very least, I wanted to at least ask them if they’d wear the 
condoms.” What a life, to go through that. And so, “Why do you want to bring your son 
through that? Why don’t you stay where you are?” And she said “Well, I do have an 
opportunity, I can make it better over here. And if this is what I have to go through to do 
it, I’m going to do it.”  
 
I: That's a whole ‘nother aspect of this job. Your interactions with the people that you’re 
apprehending. 
 
R: Yeah. But you know what? With those, you see more of the gangbangers, the cartel 
members. You know. You see more of that than you see the other. But the media doesn’t 
see that, the people don’t see that. – White agent, 8 years of experience 
 
This agent spends quite a bit of time telling me about two memorable experiences of migrants 
who “maybe do deserve to be here.” He describes his interactions with these migrants as “the 
saddest part of the job” highlighting his empathetic reaction. Nevertheless, he ends by 
discounting these cases on numerical grounds, arguing that deserving migrants represent the 
minority of crossers in relation to the “gangbangers” and “cartel members.” Issuing this 
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corrective at the end suggests that he wanted to counter the impression that these types of stories 
are representative.  
 In sum, the criminalization narrative allows agents to cultivate legitimacy by emphasizing 
archetypal “bad guys,” who are essential counterparts to their “good guy” role. Disputing the 
morality of immigrants through criminalization allows agents to avoid moral ambiguities and 
discount reputational issues as uninformed outsider perspectives. The result is a legitimate social 
system where the punishment “fits the crime,” as opposed to a morally dubious situation where 
they are implementing policies that are ill-suited to deal with the phenomenon at hand. 
Insecurity: “We don’t know who they are”  
 
The “insecurity” narrative differs from “criminalization as corrective” because it 
concedes that not all immigrants are criminals. The issue, according to this narrative, is that 
agents cannot differentiate the criminals from the non-criminals simply by looking at them. This 
is because immigrants’ true identities come into focus in the post-arrest processing unit, through 
the use of fingerprint databases. Therefore, trying to “judge a book by its cover” could pose a 
physical threat to agents if they “let their guard down.” Storytelling is fundamental to this 
narrative: agents legitimize their work by highlighting instances when they were deceived by 
migrants’ inscrutable character.  
The following story explicitly discounts the relevance of compassion by highlighting the 
inscrutable nature of immigrants’ identities:   
So they say, do you feel bad? I don’t feel bad. I always tell a story and I’ll share it with 
you. When I came back from the academy… the first group that we apprehended, there 
was an older man. They were walking for a couple days. And his feet were cut up and 
they were bleeding. They caught him up in the mountain somewhere. And I felt so bad, I 
gave him my lunch, I gave him my water. You know? And on the way back, I was telling 
my training officer, I was like I don’t know if I can do this every day… That was my 
initial thought. Went back to the station. They would make us process them so we learned 
how to process. And it turned out that the same old man had raped a nine-year-old little 
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girl. And when I asked him about it, he just kind of smirked and looked away. So I was 
pretty angry about that. You know. If I’m getting people like that off the streets, the most 
innocent-looking person can be the worst person ever. – Latino, 8 years of experience 
 
This story is emblematic of the many ways that agents communicate (1) how their sympathy for 
immigrants has dissipated through experience; and (2) the inscrutable nature of immigrants they 
have arrested. In this instance, the agent admits feeling bad for this man given his physical 
condition and his age; he even gave him his lunch and water. However, the man’s fingerprints 
reveal him to be a child rapist who smirks when the agent confronts him. This experience teaches 
the agent that “the most innocent looking person can be the worst person ever” and confirms the 
virtuousness of his role, which is to get “people like that off the streets.”  
It is important to note that these stories are turning-points that occur early in agents’ 
career. Typically, agents describe how at the beginning, they used to feel bad for migrants, but 
these types of experiences allow them to gradually discard those feelings, which run counter to 
their mission. Firsthand experience is not a prerequisite for agents to learn about immigrants’ 
inscrutable nature. These experiences are passed down as “war stories” and are effective tools 
that teach law enforcement agents about the dangers of their job, making them a critical part of 
their socialization process (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010). In this case, these stories teach 
agents that they cannot trust their own feelings of compassion or their judgments about migrants. 
Over time, these experiences become part of a larger normative structure that thwarts agents’ 
moral impetus toward doing what is right and ensures their compliance with professional 
mandates. The following quotes demonstrate how this narrative is linked to agents’ mechanical 
application of bureaucratic procedures: 
You just never know. So you treat everybody out in the field the same ‘cause you never 
know. There's been times where I'm almost sure, this seems like a good person or 
whatever, then you go back and they have a huge criminal record. Whether it be child 
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molester and you're like ‘wow, I kind of judged that one wrong.’ You know? So that's 
why everybody is kind of treated the same way out in the field. 
 – Latina agent, 6 years of experience 
 
And you just don't know who you encounter until you encounter them. So you treat 
everybody like you just don't know which way it’s gonna go. And that's why we have the 
training we do. And then the procedures and protocols we use. And some people don’t 
like that. Oh, pobrecito alien, this and that. Well, you just don't know what you got until 
you can identify them. – Latino agent, 20 years of experience 
 
This narrative about danger and unpredictability frees agents of the burden of having to act upon 
the moral distinctions they recognize, allowing them to implement procedures homogenously 
across the board.  
The following quote demonstrates how this narrative is a broader feature of law 
enforcement occupational culture (Paoline 2004). In this case, the agent is comparing herself to 
police officers who have some information about the call they are responding to. She argues that 
this is not the case with Border Patrol agents, who have no information about the people they 
encounter out in the desert—this “unknownness” creates a sense of threat and fear among 
immigration agents (Hall 2010). This excerpt demonstrates how this sense of danger thwarts 
their compassion for migrants, resulting in a standardized application of bureaucratic procedures. 
And where it gets very difficult is my compassion or humanitarian side says okay, I see a 
group of seventy, I see thirty children under the age of seven and I see twenty females 
and then the rest are adult males. Okay, which one of them is a serial killer? Which one 
of them is a rapist? Which one of them is a murderer? I don't know any of this. So I have 
to be able to speak and find out and talk. So not all of them are bad. But I have to assume 
each one of them are because I don't know them. I don't know what I'm getting myself 
into. And I'm outnumbered. – White Female agent, 17 years of experience 
 
Referring to immigrants, this agent concedes that “not all of them are bad” but concludes that she 
has to assume that they are in order to keep herself safe. This demonstrates how this narrative 
allows agents to transgress the question of compassion for some migrants, by focusing on danger 
as a characteristic of their work. While this narrative relies on the logic of immigrant criminality, 
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it concedes that not everyone who crosses the border without authorization has committed a 
heinous crime; the point is that agents cannot distinguish who has. 
 Overall, this narrative allows agents to portray immigrants as essentially inscrutable, 
which creates a sense of unpredictability that justifies the state’s crime and terror control 
approach to immigration enforcement. The war stories that underlie this narrative teach agents 
that their judgments about immigrants’ moral character can be wrong. Over time, stories that cast 
doubt on immigrants’ identities effectively thwart agents’ moral impulses, ensuring that they 
stick to bureaucratic procedures to be safe. 
Caring Control: “We treat them well” 
 
While the previous two narratives allow agents to cultivate self-legitimacy by disputing 
immigrants’ morality, “caring control” is about establishing legitimacy by framing themselves as 
sympathetic. This narrative exemplifies the oxymoron of “compassionate repression” (Fassin 
2005) that underlies modern immigration control. It allows agents to draw on humanitarian 
discourses without actually changing the legal consequences of migrants’ apprehension.  
The following agent provides an example of the caring control narrative. First, she 
repeats the public’s oft-stated question about compassion, and continues with her response.   
Don’t you feel bad sending people that just want to come to work? And you know what I 
say is, it’s like I said, I’m not hurting them. I’m simply just sending them back to where 
they came from… I would rather a lot of times send them back than to let maybe a seven-
year-old come through and have them be staying in a stash house with no food, no 
electricity, for months with strangers. And me not knowing if they’re okay. I would much 
rather send them back to their family. – Latina agent, 7 years of experience  
 
This agent uses the example of a young child who is travelling alone to argue that a removal is 
better than the child staying in a stash house with strangers. The possibility that “back to where 
they came from” may not be a place where the child is actually better off does not figure into this 
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agent’s rationalization. That is, the alternatives are to stay in a stash house or be reunited with 
family; this juxtaposition makes the deportation seem like the more reasonable option.  
In addition to compassionate discourses, the caring control narratives emphasizes that 
agents provide comfort articles—blankets, clothing, shoes, toys for children, food and drink—to 
make migrants’ custodial experiences less harsh. The following agent exemplifies this pattern: 
I have a heart too, you know. And there’s times I feel bad. Especially when we get kids 
and their families. And you know, just a family. And for the most part, you might not 
know their whole story. But you picture, I have kids myself. So it does touch your heart. 
But there’s a lot of agents that will give stuff to the kids. I’ve given tennis shoes, shorts, 
whatever. If I have stuff in my locker. There was one lady that her whole shorts ripped 
because she slid. She had some pants and her buttocks was showing. We give them stuff. 
Everybody does. That’s what people don’t see. – Latina agent, 6 years of experience  
 
For agents, “giving them stuff” is an example of going beyond the call of duty to show their 
compassion toward deserving migrants. Highlighting these instances allows them to dispute 
media reports of the Border Patrol’s callous approach and inadequate holding facilities, 
especially in relation to Central American asylum-seeking families. Agents’ emphasis on “stuff” 
may ease the harshness of some migrants’ detention experience and make agents feel better 
about their job, but ultimately it does not make a difference in terms of legal consequences.  
Another dimension of the caring control narrative goes beyond comfort articles and 
emphasizes respectful and humane interactions with migrants. Latino agents place particular 
emphasis on this dimension, which can be understood as the fair treatment component of 
procedural justice. Many Latino agents report using their language and cultural skills to put 
migrants at ease during the detention experience. For example, one Latino agent reports, “I joke 
with them, you know. When I catch them, I say ‘you guys want to know a secret? Saturdays and 
Sundays I don't work’. And they're like ‘ah.’ So I try to be, you know, make them feel better.” 
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Many agents talk about treating migrants with respect, as this Latino agent who says “They’re 
human, you know? I talk to them as men and if you give respect, you get respect.”  
Latino agents also report more cognitive dissonance than other agents when faced with 
moral ambiguities. They rely on this caring control narrative to resolve those issues. The 
following agent recounts an experience where he had to process a young girl who was traveling 
alone. This scenario takes place at the processing station, after the girl had been apprehended.  
I looked at the girl…and I was thinking like, oh, Dios que no me toque a mi procesarla, 
no la quiero procesar. [Oh God, I don’t want it to be me to process her, I don’t want to 
process her] And then next thing you know, it was me doing the paperwork. And all the 
agents and everything, we take care of our people, our illegals and stuff like that. People 
that we catch. And I remember some of these guys went out to McDonald's and brought 
her food… She had toys, you name it, juice, candies, she had everything in there with 
her. And I was processing. And finally she started to like, I started talking to her in 
Spanish, just being nice. And she started to open up a little bit… - Latino agent, 6 years 
of experience  
 
This agent reports how using his Spanish language skills and “being nice” allowed this girl to 
open up. He also highlights how she was given food, toys, and candy to ease her experience. In 
the end, she was processed through the predetermined bureaucratic procedures, but according to 
this agent, she received special treatment. 
 Overall, the caring control narrative provides examples of agents putting immigrants at 
ease and making their experience less harsh, usually by providing comfort items, but also by 
interacting with them more humanely. Agents do not provide examples of exercising discretion 
to alter the legal consequences for deserving migrants. This is important, because citizens judged 
as morally worthy often benefit from rule-bending from cops (Oberfield 2014). However, my 
findings suggest that Border Patrol agents seldom exercise their discretionary power in favor of 
immigrants. Therefore, these types of humanitarian acts are one way for agents to justify the 
punitive nature of the immigration system, especially in light of their interactions with deserving 
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migrants. Ultimately, this narrative has the effect of making agents and perhaps some migrants 
“feel better” about the process, without changing the legal outcome.  
In summary, the caring control narrative differs from the previous two in that it locates 
legitimacy in agents’ purported humanity instead of migrants’ supposed immorality. In the social 
reality that agents construct with this narrative, they are benevolent gatekeepers (Armenta 2012) 
who put migrants at ease with their humane approach.  
Discussion 
The legitimacy of the U.S. immigration control system is founded on the idea that 
undocumented immigrants are criminals and terrorists (Rodriguez and Paredes 2014). 
Immigration agents’ moral authority is therefore based on the premise that they are the “good 
guys” engaged in a morally righteous fight against a variety of “bad guys.” However, the reality 
of immigration agents’ daily work differs from the lore that is created through bureaucratic 
ideology. Agents actually implement punitive, crime-based bureaucratic procedures on a 
heterogeneous group of migrants, most of whom are economic migrants and families. This gap 
between the securitization of immigration at the political-bureaucratic level and the humanitarian 
dimensions of modern immigration flows creates a legitimacy deficit.   
This chapter illustrates how agents restore their moral authority and the legitimacy of the 
broader control apparatus they represent. I demonstrate that agents’ claims to legitimacy center 
on two strategies—disputing immigrants’ morality (i.e. “criminalization” and “insecurity”) and 
establishing their own morality through procedural fairness (i.e. “caring control”). Their 
legitimation narratives are functional at the individual and institutional level. Agents use them to 
resolve moral ambiguities and to dispute their organization’s reputational issues. By allowing 
agents to cultivate a moral authority and restore the legitimacy of their broader system, these 
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narratives establish a normative foundation for agents’ compliance with their mandates. This 
connection to compliance is what makes legitimation narratives functional for the Border Patrol. 
The substance and function of agents’ legitimation suggests that the government’s image-
crafting strategies are not only for public consumption; bureaucratic ideologies are also about 
securing a compliant workforce. It is critical for the Border Patrol to be able to trigger normative 
mechanisms that lead to compliance because agents often work alone, in remote areas of the 
border regions. This is precisely the type of autonomy that increases street-level bureaucrats’ 
discretionary power (Lipsky 2010). However, by socializing agents to see themselves as the 
“good guys” engaged in a righteous fight against a variety of “bad guys,” the state increases the 
odds that agents will stay within the behavioral confines created for them. Of course, threats of 
formal sanctions from supervisors are also very real mechanisms capable of securing compliance 
in this paramilitary organization. However, normative mechanisms are necessary, because 
instrumental deterrence strategies are less effective and more expensive (Tyler 2006).   
My emphasis on the normative mechanisms underlying agents’ compliance may seem 
incongruent with existing research on immigration discretion. Seminal studies have shown that 
immigration bureaucrats have substantial power to diverge from their mandates (Calavita 1992; 
Heyman 2009), but this work was conducted in the Immigration and Naturalization Services 
agency, prior to the emergence of the Department of Homeland Security. Today’s federal 
immigration agents seem to exercise less discretion, at least when it comes to the deportation 
process (Motomura 2010). This lack of discretion highlights the importance of studying 
compliance, and also suggests novel directions for studying bureaucrats’ administrative power.  
First, when studying today’s immigration agents, it is critical to contextualize their work 
within the branch of the immigration bureaucracy that they belong to. In the DHS, Customs and 
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Border Protection (the Border Patrol’s parent agency) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement are charged with border and interior control. The United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services adjudicates applications for legal migration and other naturalization 
benefits. My findings on compliance or lack of discretionary action among border control agents 
may not be generalizable to other branches of the bureaucracy, highlighting a fruitful direction 
for future research. Relatedly, it is critical to reveal the pressure points where enforcement 
agents have the most or least autonomy to engage in discretion. My analysis suggests that agents 
seldom veer away from bureaucratic procedures when it comes to making apprehensions 
decisions, but that there is more flexibility in the post-arrest processing unit. Finally, we must 
locate discretionary power within the U.S. immigration bureaucracy’s chain of command. 
Arbitrating whether frontline agents lack the power to depart from the Border Patrol’s 
predetermined consequence delivery system, or whether they have that power but resist doing so, 
is a particularly important direction for future research.   
Furthermore, while I have emphasized agents’ quest for self-legitimacy, there are 
organization-level benefits gleaned from agents’ legitimation work. My analysis suggests that the 
Border Patrol’s mismatched approach to managing migration will remain stable, in part because 
of agents’ quest for self-legitimacy. Legitimacy leads to stability in organizations by maintaining 
the status quo, even when that status quo includes non-optimal practices (Johnson, Dowd, and 
Ridgeway 2006). Such is the case in immigration, where crime-control and terror-prevention 
procedures are incompatible with the humanitarian dimensions of the phenomenon. My analysis 
reveals that over time, agents learn to accept the organization’s mismatched practices as “the 
way things are.” In other words, their quest for self-legitimacy, which is necessary for them to do 
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their job, also validates the broader system. This legitimacy stifles the possibility that agents will 
develop a critique of the Border Patrol’s practices that could lead to change.  
Moreover, I show that Latinos may be inclined toward a more humane approach to 
immigration control. The fact that humanitarian discourses are a broader feature of immigration 
control politics (Fassin 2005) calls into question whether these reports are strategic impression-
management techniques that arise from their racialized legitimacy issues, or genuine indicators 
of their practices. To arbitrate these two possibilities, future research must triangulate agents’ 
reports with immigrants’ perspectives and, ideally, with observational data—a difficult task 
given the DHS’s gatekeeping practices. Still, if agents’ reports are reliable indicators of their 
practices, this finding has implications for scholars of racialized social control (Ward and Hanink 
2016) and those interested in the impact of race on procedural justice (Huo and Tyler 2000). 
My work also has implications for those interested in emotional labor in immigration 
bureaucracies. Research shows that immigration bureaucrats create feelings rules to cope with 
emotional dilemmas they experience on the job (Eggebø 2012). These feelings rules are “pre-
scripts to action” because in helping people manage their emotions, they also regulate their 
behavior so that it conforms to certain expectations (Hochschild 1979). Although these are 
critical insights, by focusing on inward-facing emotional labor, this work neglects the fact that 
empathetic discourses can also be strategic efforts to address institutional legitimacy issues. In  
sum, these scripts may help agents who are struggling to reconcile emotional dilemmas, but they 
are also critical for the state because they thwart frontline agents’ discretionary power.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Race and Professionalism: 
A Focus on Latino Agents 
 
 
Almost half of the U.S. Border Patrol is Latino. Most Latino agents are Mexican 
Americans who grew up along the southwestern borderlands that they now police. For these men 
and women, a job in federal immigration enforcement—which requires Spanish, but not a 
college degree—is an excellent route to social mobility given otherwise sparse labor markets in 
border communities (Heyman 2002). Many of these Latinos are military veterans who have 
material incentives for joining the ranks of the U.S. Border Patrol and other federal immigration 
enforcement agencies. Immigration control jobs are largely situated along the U.S.-Mexico 
border, giving many of them a chance to return home while “rolling in” the retirement benefits 
they accrue in the military. Consequently, Latinos are a readily-available recruitment pool for the 
federal government, one that has been repeatedly tapped to grow the immigration control 
apparatus and to fulfill diversity mandates within the federal workforce (Department of 
Homeland Security 2016). Once employed, these Latinos are thrust into the middle of a 
racialized immigration debate where they embody the state and the target population. In this 
way, Latino immigration agents represent one case of racial minority “justice workers” (Ward 
and Hanink 2016; Ward 2006) whose jobs in social control are a step up the mobility ladder and 
a step into the paradoxical position of policing co-ethnics on behalf of the state.  
This chapter examines whether and how Latino Border Patrol agents perceive 
race/ethnicity to shape their encounters with Latino immigrants. Prior research on this population 
has primarily examined how they negotiate tensions between their professional and racial group 
memberships (Heyman 2002; Correa and Thomas 2015; Prieto 2015). I extend this work by 
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examining whether Latinos believe that they do immigration control differently than their non-
Latino counterparts. This is an inherently relational question about the substantive and symbolic 
effects of having a representative immigration control bureaucracy.  
Representative Bureaucracy 
Much been written about the overrepresentation of Latinos as the targets of U.S. 
immigration enforcement efforts, but there is limited research on Latinos as the conduits of this 
type of social control (Correa and Thomas 2015). As government employees who share an 
ethno-racial category with the bulk of their “clientele,” Latino immigration agents are an 
excellent case study of representative bureaucracy. Representative bureaucracy scholars ask 
whether having a diverse government workforce improves the services that marginalized groups 
receive in their interactions with the state (Meier 1975). The driving assumption is that 
demographic shifts in bureaucracies are not purely symbolic, but actually have substantive 
effects because minorities will make decisions that are informed by the racial group membership 
(Ward and Hanink 2016). John Skrentny (2013) calls this assumption “racial realism,” the idea 
that racial categories correspond to identities and competencies, resulting in improved services 
for minorities and a variety of advantages for businesses and government bureaucracies.   
One of the major issues with racial realism, aside from its essentialist assumptions about 
race/ethnicity, is its inattention to how organizational structures and cultures can thwart racial 
commonality. Street-level bureaucracies are rule-laden environments that force workers to 
balance their agency’s interests and their clients’ needs in the implementation of policy 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000). Frontline bureaucrats work at a relative distance from 
central authority structures, but they are not autonomous actors when it comes to exercising their 
discretionary power—no matter what their social group commitments are (Bradbury and 
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Kellough 2011; Meier and Bohte 2001). Whether minority bureaucrats can engage in 
systematically different behaviors within highly controlled organizational contexts, even when 
they do integrate race into how they understand their professional role, is an open question 
(Watkins-Hayes 2009). Furthermore, as Watkins-Hayes (2009) points out, “bureaucratic 
environments with histories of racial inequality and orientations that apply “red tape” 
restrictively or punitively are likely to generate strong boundaries between racial minorities in 
bureaucrat-client relationships.” (p. 235). The social distance engendered by bureaucratic 
structures may be especially pronounced between Latino agents and co-ethnic clientelle who are 
constructed as terrorists, criminals, freeloaders, and cultural threats (Chavez 2008).  
Latinos in Immigration Control 
 
Latino immigration enforcement agents occupy a precarious position vis-à-vis their 
ethno-racial and professional communities. As representatives of an immigration control system 
that primarily targets Latino immigrants (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013), these 
agents are shunned by co-ethnics as “race traitors” (Prieto 2015). However, they are also 
minorities within a historically white institution that has a record of racial violence against 
Mexicans and other Latinos (Lytle-Hernandez 2010). How they negotiate this in-between 
position has implications for how immigration policing is carried out, as well as for how we 
understand the strength of racial group boundaries.  
The significance of having a racially representative immigration control bureaucracy 
includes symbolic and substantive possibilities. For the government, the symbolic benefit of 
having Latinos enforce immigration law is at least twofold: it can tout its gains in diversifying 
the federal workforce, while simultaneously using these agents to deflect accusations of racism 
in immigration control. Furthermore, Latino immigration agents may improve immigrants’ views 
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of the bureaucracy, just like diversifying police departments can increase their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public (Tyler and Huo 2002). Nevertheless, the substantive effects of Latino 
immigration enforcement agents’ presence is less clear. Per Ward (2016), the substantive effects 
of racial representation in social control bureaucracies require that legal authorities be aware of 
and accountable to the preferences of those subjected to their power. This requires that legal 
authorities be in positions of influence and that they have a relationship with constituencies that 
can convey the ideas and preferences of those under the state’s control (Ward 2006). Therefore, 
whether Latinos have a substantive impact on immigration control is a question about their 
organizational clout and personal commitment to the needs of Latino immigrants in their 
custody—a question which has not been addressed in existing research.  
In large part, this gap has been created because the few published studies on Latino 
immigration enforcement agents do not differentiate between symbolic boundary-making 
processes and substantive effects in their analysis. Existing research on this population tends to 
weave in and out of documenting social identity processes and work practices when examining 
how Latino immigration agents negotiate their professional role and racial group membership. 
Prieto’s (2015) recent study is an excellent example of the dominant approach to studying this 
population. Drawing on interviews with six Latino immigration enforcement agents in San 
Diego, California, Prieto examines how his respondents contest accusations that they are “race 
traitors.” He finds that they respond in two ways: by reporting a more humane work approach 
rooted in cultural community with immigrants, or by emphasizing their U.S. national loyalties. 
Prieto concludes that both of these responses have the same effect: to buttress the hegemony of 
the racial state. That is, the inclusion of Latinos into the immigration apparatus is meant to 
“inoculate immigration enforcement against accusations of discrimination and racism.” (p. 502). 
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While this conclusion may be appropriate, it glosses over much of the analytical complexity of 
this issue by failing to differentiate between symbolic and substantive effects.   
At its core, Prieto’s study is about the symbolic boundaries that these agents deploy in 
response to being socially punished for disrupting normative expectations of “transracial 
solidarity.” Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions that people use to differentiate “us” 
from “them”; these boundaries are group formation mechanisms because people deploy them to 
contest the groups they are categorized into and make claims into higher status groups (Lamont 
and Molnar 2002). As such, Prieto’s study is largely a group formation analysis that informs, but 
is different from a study of the work practices that agents report employing. Although Prieto fails 
to differentiate between these two different analytical goals, his conclusion is squarely about the 
substantive effects of Latino representation in the immigration control bureaucracy. Ultimately, 
he discounts the possibility that these agents could have a tangible effect on the way immigration 
control is carried out in the U.S. 
 Heyman’s (2002) seminal study of Mexican American Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS) officers in the early 1990s is similarly incomplete, albeit less so. Drawing on 
interviews, Heyman shows how the empathy that Mexican American officers might extend to 
Mexican immigrants is thwarted by their different citizenship status and because they are on 
opposite sides of the bureaucracy. Highlighting the social distance that  bureaucracies can 
engender between implementers and their “clients” gets us closer to differentiating between 
symbolic and substantive effects. However, at least some of this author’s interview questions 
were phrased in a way that would have prompted a symbolic boundary-making response from his 
interviewees. For example, Heyman reports asking, “What were your thoughts as a Hispanic 
when you went to work for the INS?” (p. 487). The wording of the question already includes the 
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normative assumption that they, as Hispanics, should have thought about their ethnicity/race 
when deciding to work for the INS. This is not an unfounded assumption, given the social 
context that I have outlined above, but it is not methodologically ideal because it primes agents 
to contest normative expectations about ethno-racial group commitments. Similarly, based on 
interviews with 6 Latino immigration enforcement agents representing a variety of law 
enforcement agencies along the U.S.-Texas border, Correa and Thomas (2015) argue that 
nationalistic and security-based ideologies wash out the potential group-based solidarity, but it is 
unclear how they came to this conclusion. In sum, all of these studies arrive at the same 
verdict—that diversifying the immigration control bureaucracy has no substantive effects—
based on analyses of symbolic boundary-making processes.  
The major difference between my work and previous research is that I do not prime 
agents to think about the relevance of race/ethnicity to their work. Instead, I adopt a processual 
approach to ethnicity (Wimmer 2013) that documents whether and how identity emerges as 
salient during the course of their work (see also Brubaker 2006). That is, instead of asking 
questions like, “How does being Latino shape how you do your job?” I opted to ask agents about 
memorable interactions with immigrants, their family’s opinion of their job, and engaged them in 
conversations about the public’s views of immigration enforcement. This approach, which does 
not assume that race/ethnicity shapes their work practices, was a productive way to reveal when 
and how race/ethnicity becomes salient for agents and whether it impacts how they carry out 
their job. It also yields the analytic leverage to differentiate between symbolic boundary-making 
processes and substantive differences in work practices. Overall, my work illustrates in a more 
nuanced way how these agents negotiate their professional duties and subjectively-felt and 
externally-imposed racial group norms.  
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Before continuing, it is important to recognize that there may be a large gap between 
what agents say they do and what they actually do (Lamont and Swidler 2014). Agents’ reports 
should be taken with caution because, in the absence of behavioral observations or other data to 
disaggregate agents’ decisions by race, it is difficult to confirm their veracity. However, agents’ 
narratives contain the tenets that guide their actions and are thus critical indicators of how they 
think about the relationship between their background and professional practices. I first report 
the symbolic boundary making findings, then end with an analysis of substantive effects.    
Findings 
Symbolic Boundaries: I’m American and It’s Just a Job 
 
 Latino Border Patrol agents receive social sanctions for transgressing normative 
expectations of ethnic solidarity, regardless of their own individual sense of commitment to the 
Latino community or degree of ethnic identification (see Vega 2014). These social sanctions are 
epitomized by questions such as “How does it feel to arrest your own people?” or less explicit, 
but equally incisive ones like Que tu no eres Mexicano? or “Are you not Mexican?”. These 
questions are asked by people in their immediate social networks, as well as immigrants 
themselves. That immigrants feel emboldened to apply these social sanctions at the otherwise 
disempowering point of arrest speaks to the strength of the normative expectations of ethnic 
bonds (Barth 1998). Agents’ modal response to these types of questions is to emphasize their 
American identity and/or explain that “it’s just a job.” 
If we accept that these questions are not genuine inquiries, but rhetorical probes meant to 
remind agents they are being bad Latinos, then it makes sense that they would respond in this 
way. In effect, this reply is a defensive one, where agents are deploying their American national 
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identity to contest the premise that they are race traitors. The following quote by a Latina with 8 
years of experience illustrates this theme: 
They’ll throw that, ‘Oh, you’re one of us.’ I’m like well, I was born here. You know? So 
I don’t know what to tell you. Sometimes-I’m part Native American too-so I’ll joke with 
them, I’m an Indian. I’m Native American. So. I just make jokes. Sorry, this is my job. 
 
Agents’ deflection to their American identity is not a rejection of their ethnic attachment per 
se—it is actually a strategic and temporary emphasis on a part of their identity that is not under 
attack. Understanding this distinction is critical because without it, these agents could appear to 
favor a de-ethnicized mode of national identity that casts off sub-national group attachments 
(Citrin and Sears 2009). Or seen through a critical race lens, this emphasis on their Americanness 
signals a “repudiation” of their Latino identity that has dire implications for their interactions 
with immigrants (Correa and Thomas 2015; Prieto 2015).    
The following Latino with 10 years of experience shows how my respondents emphasize 
their American identity to explain that they (as Hispanics) can do this job, without repudiating 
their ethnic background, or while believing in a pluralist America. This agent is explaining that 
the reason he can do this job, even though he “feels bad” for immigrants, is because he knows 
that it would not change anything if he were to quit. Then he adds, “I respect my country’s laws. 
I’m proud of serving in the military and being an American. I consider myself an American 
before anything else. My parents are from Mexico but I was born and raised here.” This 
American-centered discourse could make it appear that this agent subscribes to assimilationist 
notions that people should shed their ethnic attachment to become Americans. This supports the 
assertion that “Latina/o agents…demonstrate an inability to see themselves within the Other 
despite sharing an ethnic-racial cultural background...” (Correa and Thomas 2015: 246). 
However, later on in the interview, he recounts the following interaction: 
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I’ve had trainees, when I was a post academy instructor, say “I think if you don’t speak 
English, you should get out.” I told them, I said “you know what? My grandmother is 
ninety something years old. She does not know one word of English. And she’s a U.S. 
citizen…What the fuck are you gonna do about it?” 
 
This agent recounted at least one other instance, aside from the one above, of him calling out his 
colleagues for making “racist comments.” In that regard, he is unique among my respondents for 
showing a certain level of comfort with the topic of racial discrimination. However, even this 
racially conscious agent chooses to emphasize his American identity to explain how he, as the 
child of Mexican immigrants, can do this job. This buttresses my argument that agents 
emphasize their national identity, not as a wholesale rejection of their Latinoness, but as a stigma 
management strategy (Lamont and Mizrachi 2012), or turn to an aspect of their identity that is 
more aligned with their job. That is, as Americans, it makes sense that they would be enforcing 
immigration law—even if, as Latinos, they are criticized for doing so.  
Another way that agents contest the social sanctions they receive for enforcing 
immigration law against their own people is to clarify that “it’s just a job.” This emphasis on 
their professional role allows them to reroute the conversation into less contentious terrain. This 
also serves to remind their audience that “it’s not personal” and if it’s not personal, then the job 
has nothing to do with their ethnoracial commitments. The following Latino illustrates this point: 
R: They [immigrants] tell me, ‘I can’t believe you’re arresting…your own people. Are 
you Mexican?’ They’ll ask me stuff like that. ‘Are you Mexican?’ Then you should 
know, your parents probably-’. Sometimes they’ll say stuff like that. They’re just, it’s in 
desperation. 
 
I: What do you say? 
 
R: It’s just a job. You have to do a job, I’ve got to do my job. They’re paying me to do 
this job. I try to tell somebody it’s not personal but that’s how I see it. It’s not, I’m not 
doing it for any other reason…That’s how I see it. To me, it’s as simple as that. It’s just a 
job.  
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This agent clarifies that she’s not “doing it for any other reason” other than the fact that it’s her 
professional role. This response allows her to pass on the responsibility to a generalized other—
the government, the policy, the boss—and avoid engaging with the criticism she receives. 
Overall, then, emphasizing that “it’s just a job” allows agents to deflect criticism and avoid 
entering a conversation about the (in)appropriateness of their actions, in light of their ethno-
racial background.  
 In summary, all Latino agents experience social sanctions for disrupting normative 
expectations of ethnic solidarity on immigration. When they do, they consistently respond by 
emphasizing their American identity and their professional role. I argue that these are strategic 
boundary-making strategies that allow them to deflect attention to a less contentious part of their 
identity. However, they should not be taken as a reliable indicator of their ethnoracial 
committments or work approach. In the following section I present the findings on substantive 
effects, where I move beyond the symbolic boundary-making strategies to whether and how 
agents believe that their race/ethnicity informs the way they do their work.  
Substantive Effects: Impartial and Compassionate Professionalism 
Impartial Professionalism: “I Just Treat Everyone the Same” 
 
You have two types of Hispanic agents. You might have those like me who kind of feels 
bad. I still do my job, I still firmly believe that there's laws to be followed. But I just do it 
with a little more compassion. But I've seen other Hispanics…they don't care. And I don't 
know if maybe it's because it's just in their personality. ‘I'm here, F you, I'm here.’ – 
Latino, 10 years of experience 
 
 As the quote above hints, my analysis reveals that there are two “types of Hispanic 
agents” or rather, two modes of professionalism adopted by Latino Border Patrol agents. The 
first and most common mode is an impartial professionalism that rejects the idea that their ethno-
racial background somehow shapes the way they do their job. Agents who adopt this mode 
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generally rebuke the idea that sharing an ethno-racial background with their work targets should 
be relevant to the way they do their job. Instead, they argue that they act “professional”, which 
translates into treating everyone equally regardless of their ethnic background or national origin 
(Wilkins 1998). Regardless of agents’ intentions, this mode of professionalism can be interpreted 
as an affront by co-ethnics because it disrupts expectations that there should be some substantive 
return to ethnic commonality, even in government bureaucracies (Huo and Tyler 2000; Watkins-
Hayes 2011).    
 The following exchange I had with a Latino who adopts an impartial professionalism 
illustrates several important data themes. First, it shows that I was able to glean information 
about the professional relevance of agents’ ethnic background without explicitly asking them 
about it. As mentioned above, this was important because I was interested in differentiating 
between 1) the symbolic boundaries they deploy in response to social sanctions and 2) what they 
perceive as the substantive relevance of their ethnicity/race in their role as immigration agents. 
The question, “Does your job ever come up in conversation with friends or family outside of 
work?” allowed me to do just that. White and Latino agents answered this question in 
systematically different ways. The former often told me that their parents were proud, but that 
they worried about their safety, or that they came from a law enforcement background; the latter 
talked about the tension between their ethnic and professional roles.  
The second note I want to make about this quote is related to this methodological 
approach. One should note that in this case, the agent’s skeptical uncle applies a social sanction 
to which he responds by emphasizing his American identity. This illustrates the previous 
section’s argument about symbolic boundaries: when faced with reproachful questions by co-
ethnics, agents deploy their American identity defensively. Finally, and most relevant to the 
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question of substantive effects, this agent demonstrates that the mode of impartial 
professionalism rejects the idea that their Latinoness should matter in a professional setting. I 
quote the exchange at length so that the reader can better grasp these themes in action.    
I: Does your job ever come up in conversation with friends or family outside of work? 
 
R: It does. Most of them are positive about it. My mom and my dad are very proud, you 
know, of what I do. My uncles, a few of my uncles are proud and one of them is kind of 
skeptical. ... 
 
I: Why is your uncle skeptical? What is he skeptical about? 
 
R: … the whole thing with Latin-. I’m Mexican descent. And you know, you might make 
a comment here or there… That's about the only time. The rest of the people I haven’t, 
they've been very accepting and proud. 
 
I: You mentioned the Mexican descent piece. How does he bring that up? 
 
R: Just I think he said one time, doesn’t it bother me that they’re Mexicans as well. And I 
was like, ‘First of all, I'm sorry to say this, but I’m American. I was born in America, I’ll 
fight for America. But I won’t fight for Mexico.’ Look, I know these people are, I’m 
Mexican descent. I’ll treat everybody equally. It doesn’t matter if they’re Mexican or 
Irish... Everybody deserves equal treatment and I’m not going to treat someone different 
just because I’m of Mexican descent. – Latino, 8 years of experience 
 
Agents that adopt this impartial professionalism rely on the notion of equal treatment to 
legitimize their approach. For them, being fair means treating everyone the same, regardless of 
their or their subjects’ ethno-racial background. Agents’ narratives suggest that they are 
compelled to justify this approach because of the normative expectations to which they are 
subjected, especially from immigrants themselves. That is, according to Latino agents, Latino 
immigrants act more willful around them and often ask them for a break, say things like déjame 
ir or “let me go”—a request that they do not make of White agents.  
Agents report that immigrants often use their Spanish language ability to gauge whether 
they should ask them for a break. As the following quote demonstrates, agents who are fluent in 
	   74 
Spanish get more questions from immigrants because it is easier to communicate with them and 
because they may feel more comfortable doing so.  
[T]hey might feel that I guess, that, I guess if you want to call it relationship because the 
Spanish would be a lot easier to communicate with me. But I mean, like I said, I just treat 
everybody the same. Not friends, I’m not enemies, I’m not anything. I treat them 
professionally. Latino, 7 years of experience  
 
Immigrants’ more familiar demeanor toward co-ethnic agents is interpreted as a liability by those 
who adopt an impartial professionalism. The perceived liability is rooted in agents’ training and 
bureaucratic socialization; they are taught that they should always be in control of the situation, 
especially at the point of arrest. Therefore, when immigrants act more “comfortable” around 
agents, this makes agents “uncomfortable” and puts them on high alert. Acting impartial and 
professional is a safeguard against losing control of the situation. The following excerpt from an 
agent who can pass for white is particularly instructive: 
I know often times, they might see me at first and say oh, ‘this is a white guy coming 
over here’ but when I start talking to them…they'll quickly realize hey, this guy’s 
Spanish is pretty good. I think he’s Mexican. [Laughs]. And once they figure that out, 
they kind of try to be a little more talkative and maybe even joke around saying, ‘well, if 
you're Mexican, let me go. Come on, man.’ I’ll quickly squash that… If you let them joke 
around, then that’s kind of a bad way of setting the tone, I guess. Because when you want 
them to do something, they might say well, is this guy joking with me or is this guy being 
serious? –Latino, 8 years of experience  
  
This agent’s experience as someone who is privy to how immigrants interact with non-Latino 
agents is valuable because it reveals a broad theme in Latino agents’ perspectives: that their 
ethno-racial background impacts how immigrants act toward them. This perception is consistent 
among Latino agents, regardless of the mode of professionalism they adopt. The difference is in 
how agents interpret immigrants’ higher level of comfort with them; those who adopt an 
impartial professionalism see that as a threat to their authority and their ability to control the 
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situation. In the following section, I show how those who adopt a “compassionate 
professionalism” interpret this same phenomenon.  
Compassionate Professionalism: “It’s Definitely An Advantage”  
 
I think that they’re scared. When they come, they don’t know. To them, they expect a 
white guy that is a racist. That’s the view of la migra. Racist people, racist towards 
Mexicans. So when they see someone of their same ethnic (sic), they’re speaking the 
same language, that’s treating them with respect, I think that’s helped me to do my job 
more effectively. Because I don’t get that, how do you say it? That resistance... So I think 
understanding the culture, it helps me do my job better. –Latino, 11 years of experience 
 
 While agents who adopt an impartial professionalism interpret immigrants’ higher level 
of comfort as a potential liability, those who adopt a compassionate approach interpret this as a 
advantage. For agents like the one quoted above, the fact that immigrants see someone of their 
same ethno-racial background, who has a certain facility with their language and is respectful, 
allows them to do their job better. It is critical to note that the job is still an inherently 
exclusionary and punitive one; agents’ primary task is to apprehend immigrants and process 
them for removal and/or prosecution. However, agents believe that they can make the experience 
less harsh, and perhaps even disrupt negative stereotypes about the Border Patrol that are rooted 
in its history of racial violence along the southwestern border (Lytle-Hernandez 2010).  
 The Border Patrol’s reputation for being a racist organization that disproportionately 
targets Mexicans figures prominently in agents’ compassionate professionalism narratives. 
Notably, these agents do not wholly reject the premise that the organization has a racist past; 
rather, they argue that this reputation is an artifact of USBP’s history and is no longer reflective 
of today’s Border Patrol. Alternatively, they may clarify that they have heard of agents saying 
racist things, but have never witnessed anything themselves. Still, they argue, the fact that there 
are so many Hispanic Border Patrol agents who, like them, approach their work humanely, 
means that the Patrol’s racist reputation is an unfair characterization. The following agent 
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demonstrates just how salient and serious the USBP’s reputation is for agents, even resulting in 
people disavowing them because of their job. 
Growing up here, you know, you grow up anywhere in the Hispanic community, [you 
hear] ‘pinche migra.’ You don’t want to be part of that. Those guys are mean, those guys 
are evil… You always live with that. Even today. I have a lot of friends… Old guys from 
the military that I knew, they won’t talk to me because of my job. Because they don’t 
understand it. And it’s hard in that sense because it has to be done, the job has to be done. 
And you have to come at it, and this is what I tell the Hispanic officers, ‘You don’t want 
to come at it from an enforcement perspective… you have to approach it from a 
humanitarian standpoint.’ For instance, when I came in, ninety-five to ninety-seven 
percent of the people coming across the border… were coming here to work. They had 
nothing else. Just coming for the job. –Latino, 17 years of experience  
 
This agent recognizes that the Border Patrol has a negative reputation for being “evil” and 
“mean,” a reputation that has cost him personal relationships. He resolves this concern by 
reasoning that the job has to be done and if someone is going to do it, then it is better that 
someone like him does it because he approaches his job from a humanitarian standpoint. This is 
the same advice that he gives other Hispanic agents. This approach is rooted in his understanding 
that most people come across the border to look for work. In this regard, he makes an implicit 
distinction between labor migrants and other types of undocumented border crossers, presumably 
those with a criminal record. The implication of this distinction is that the humanitarian approach 
is appropriate for labor migrants, but may not be for those with a criminal record. 
 The premise that if the job is going to be done by someone, then it is better if it is done by 
a Latino agent who understands the plight of undocumented immigrants, figures prominently in 
this theme. Several agents reference conversations with their immigrant parents as they reported 
this “better me than someone else” reasoning. The following agent demonstrates: 
[T]he big thing that got me to actually apply for the Border Patrol… was when I talked to 
my dad about it. And he told me, ‘look, there’s always going to be somebody there, 
whether it be you or somebody who is racist, somebody who does hate Mexican people 
or whatever… There’s always going to be somebody there. Why not it be somebody like 
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you that actually knows what a lot of these people are going through?’ And when he told 
me that, I was like, ‘You know what? That makes a lot of sense.’  
–Latino, 9 years of experience  
 
These conversations reveal that some agents felt apprehensive when thinking about joining the 
USBP, but after talking to their parents they were relieved of this uneasiness. Their parents’ 
message to them is about letting their background inform their practices. In giving this advice, 
parents simultaneously relieve Latino agents of their apprehension about joining an organization 
with a reputation for being anti-Latino, and remind them that can have a substantive impact on 
how this job is carried out. This substantive impact is a positive one; the assumption that 
immigrant parents make is that their children have certain experiences and skills that will result 
in them treating immigrants better than agents who do not have their background.  
Notably, this “better treatment” is not special treatment or advice to give immigrants a 
legal break. Rather, what immigrant parents tell their Latino Border Patrol agent children is to 
avoid being harsh and unsympathetic and not “abuse my power,” as another agent reported. The 
advice is to adhere to minimal standards of professionalism, instructions that would be 
unwarranted save for Border Patrol agents’ well-earned reputation for not adhering to these 
standards (Martínez, Slack, and Heyman 2013; Phillips, Hagan, and Rodriguez 2006). The 
following agent’s statements demonstrate that the Border Patrol’s reputation for being abusive is 
intimately tied to white agents’ history of racialized violence against Mexican immigrants. 
I’ve had racist comments by other agents… And I just won’t tolerate it. That's the way I 
look at it. I know that I'm going to treat people with respect. One time an alien said, he 
goes ‘Usted es Mexicano?’ And I go ‘Pues, mis papas.’ He goes ‘Eres traidor?’ And I go 
‘Pues, que prefieres? Que te agarre yo y te dé algo de comer, que te dé agua, o que te 
agarre un gabacho y te parta en la madre?’ He goes no, ‘No, mejor usted official.’ And 
I'm like, all right, man.  
 
English Translation: I’ve had racist comments by other agents…And I just won’t tolerate 
it. That's the way I look at it. I know that I'm going to treat people with respect. One time 
an alien said, he goes ‘You are Mexican?’ And I go ‘Well, my parents.’ He goes ‘You’re 
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a traitor?’ And I go ‘Well, what do you prefer? That I get you and give you something to 
eat, give you water, or that a white guy get you and kick your ass?’ He goes no, ‘No, 
better you officer.’ And I'm like, all right, man. –Latino, 10 years of experience  
 
This excerpt illustrates that agents who adhere to a mode of compassionate professionalism see 
themselves improving immigrants’ experience with the Border Patrol in a very specific way, by 
disrupting practices of racial violence by white agents. It is notable that this agents’ defensive 
response to being asked about being a traitor adheres to the pattern I outline in the previous 
section on symbolic boundaries. However, it is the later part of this agents’ retort that reveals the 
potential for substantive returns to a diverse immigration bureaucracy. After being asked whether 
he is a “traidor” he asks the immigrant whether he prefers to experience violence at the hands of 
a white agent or to be arrested by someone who is going to give him food and water. The answer 
is clearly that the latter is the better option, and the immigrant agrees. Agents’ emphasis on 
treating immigrants with respect, or “simply talk[ing] to them like humans,” reveals that this 
minimal standard of professionalism may not be the default approach.   
Discussion 
This chapter examines how Latinos negotiate their ethno-racial background in relation to 
their professional role, given that most of the immigrants they interact with on a daily basis are 
also Latinos. I divide my analysis into two sections, one on symbolic boundary-making and 
another on substantive effects. Differentiating between these concepts is critical if we are to distil 
social identity processes from reported behaviors.  
I show that race and ethnicity are a prominent feature of my respondents’ professional 
and personal lives. As Latino immigration agents, they are often reminded by immigrants and by 
their wider social networks that they are transgressing an expectation of ethnic solidarity on the 
issue of immigration. These reminders, or social sanctions, are exemplified by loaded questions 
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like, “How does it feel to arrest your own people?” It is important to mention that the expectation 
of ethnic solidarity is a normative one, and as such, it is imposed on agents regardless of their 
individual sense of commitment to the Latino community (see also Vega 2014). That is, Latino 
agents are forced to engage with the fact that they share ethno-racial markers with their work 
targets because people (both immigrants and those in their personal networks) remind them that 
their position is an offensive one. When agents experience these social sanctions, they respond 
consistently, regardless of their mode of professionalism, drawing symbolic boundaries that 
emphasize their American identity and explaining that “it’s just a job.” 
Although all Latino agents engage in similar boundary-making strategies, their ideas 
about whether/how their ethno-racial background shapes their job clusters in two patterns. I refer 
to these patterns as modes of professionalism and I identify two types: impartial and 
compassionate professionalism. Impartial professionalism is the most common. Agents who 
adopt this mode do not report doing anything differently from their non-Latino peers in their 
interactions with Latino immigrants. Instead, they pride themselves on remaining neutral and 
treating everyone equally. Many of these agents draw on notions of occupational danger to 
explain their approach, arguing that “joking with aliens can backfire,” and that being too casual 
can result in them losing control of the situation and make them vulnerable to attacks. The fact 
that the bulk of Latino agents adopt this mode of professionalism suggests that the strength of 
law enforcement culture can thwart the substantive potential of sharing an ethno-racial 
background with their subjects.   
However, there is a smaller group of agents who believe they do have certain 
competencies as Latinos and that these capabilities help them do their job not only differently, 
but better than non-Latinos. These agents adopt a compassionate professionalism that consists of 
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joking with immigrants, addressing them with respect or simply treating them “like humans.” 
Spanish-language fluency emerges as the dominant mechanism that leads to this approach, 
reinforced by deep connections to the Latina/o community either through their parents, extended 
family, or friendship networks. For these agents, their Latinoness is not an abstract group 
category, but a fundamental part of their everyday lives. This pattern suggests that some Latinos, 
namely those with more meaningful attachments to the ethnic community, can have a substantive 
impact on the qualitative character of immigration control.  
There are two important caveats to make about agents’ reports. Latino agents have an 
incentive to frame themselves as neutral or more humane, especially to deflect the social 
sanctions they receive for disrupting the norm of ethnic solidarity on the issue of immigration. 
However, we can imagine an alternative outcome, where sharing an ethno-racial category with 
their main work target would push them to prove their alliance to their colleagues by distancing 
themselves from immigrants or even adopting a harsher, more abusive stance toward them 
(Prieto 2015). In this case, Latino agents would degrade immigrants’ experience with the 
bureaucracy, instead of improving it. Existing research, including this analysis, cannot weigh in 
on this question, in large part because it lacks a systematic analysis of Latino agents’ observed 
behaviors. Similarly, without analyzing immigrants’ experiences with these agents, we do not 
know how Latino immigrants experience Latino agents’ actions.  
Indeed, current research only captures one side of the bureaucratic encounter between 
Latino Border Patrol agents and immigrants. My future research aims to produce a more 
complete analysis of the symbolic boundaries and substantive effects that occur when similarly-
raced individuals meet on opposite sides of the state’s coercive power. I am particularly 
interested in immigrants’ ideas around ‘‘proper intra-racial conduct’’ (Watkins-Hayes 2011) 
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between them and immigration control agents. As of now, we have very little information about 
immigrants’ expectation for Latino agents and whether they differ from what they expect from 
non-Latino agents. According to Alvarez (cited in Heyman 2002), there is a stereotype among 
Mexican Americans and immigrants alike that “the Chicano/a Border Patrol officer… is “worse 
than the Anglos” (see also Rodriguez and Paredes 2014), but it is unclear whether this is because 
of harsher treatment, or because agents are not meeting an expectation of racial solidarity, 
resulting in an interpretation of their attitude as a betrayal. It is likely that the answer is 
somewhere in between, and my future research will weigh in on this question.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
What Would a Reasonable Agent Do? 
Border Patrol Agents’ Use of Force  
 
The issue of unjustified shootings and excessive use of force by police has long been part 
of the American landscape. Thanks in large part to cell phone technology, today’s public can 
play a much more active role in holding officers accountable for unwarranted force decisions. 
However, this public accountability mechanism is not viable for all police organizations; the U.S. 
Border Patrol (USBP) is a case in point. At over 21,000 agents, the USBP is the largest law 
enforcement organization in the country and is growing under the Trump administration. 
However, its visibility is low due to the government’s gatekeeping structures, agents’ insular 
culture, and the fact that agents work in remote areas of the country. The public’s lack of 
familiarity with the normative tenets guiding Border Patrol agents’ use of force decisions extends 
to the research world, despite several scathing reports of their excessive force (Martínez, Slack, 
and Heyman 2013; Martínez, Cantor, and Ewing 2014; Phillips, Hagan, and Rodriguez 2006).   
 This chapter begins to fill this gap by examining the shared norms and beliefs that 
underlie Border Patrol agents’ use of force1 decisions and the way agents rationalize these 
decisions on a post-hoc basis. These elements of their occupational culture are as important as 
the official laws and policies that govern their coercive power (Terrill, Paoline, and Manning 
2003; Waegel 1984). This is so because these cultural rationales operate in the background, 
affecting how agents interpret threat in their interactions with the public, and guiding their 
behavioral responses in these situations (Klahm IV and Tillyer 2010). Therefore, any formal 
efforts to change how Border Patrol agents and other law enforcement officers wield their 
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coercive power must contend with the informal beliefs that underlie their actions (Loftus 2009; 
Micucci and Gomme 2005).  
Before delving into agents’ perspectives, it is important to consider rates of assaults 
against agents, as well as incidents of use of force by agents. It is also critical to lay out the legal 
and policy context that governs Border Patrol agents’ use-of-force training. This context is the 
foundation for their practices and threat perceptions, but also for the post-hoc explanations they 
use to justify their and their colleagues’ use-of-force decisions. 
Contextualizing Border Patrol Agents’ Use of Force 
According to the USBP’s parent agency, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), there 
were 454 assaults on Border Patrol agents in fiscal year 2016. It is unclear how the CBP defines 
an “assault,” but these incidents are relatively rare; 454 assaults represent less than 1 percent 
(0.11%) of 415,816 apprehensions conducted in fiscal year 2016 or 2.29 percent of the 19,828 
Border Patrol agents staffed during that time. To be fair, instances of force by Border Patrol 
agents are also rare, but are almost 50% higher than instances of assaults on agents. In fiscal year 
2016, Border Patrol agents reported 816 instances of use of force; 15 of these were firearm 
discharges, 559 were uses of less-lethal devices (e.g. baton, tasers, etc.), and 242 were in the 
“other” category, which include physical strikes, offensive driving techniques, and other 
compliance and control methods that rely on physical force. These 816 reported instances of 
force represent 0.2% of 415,816 apprehensions (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2017).  
Understanding the worldviews that shape agents’ use of force decisions is important, 
even if these instances constitute rare events. Agents’ worldviews structure their practices, which 
subsequently shape the qualitative character of the interaction between migrants and the coercive 
arm of the state. Also, while the instances of force are low from a numerical perspective, the 
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stakes are high because these instances can lead to the loss of life.  
Legal and Policy Context 
 
The 1989 Supreme Court case of Graham v. Connor is the most consequential federal 
case when it comes to law enforcement agents’ use of force. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme 
Court ruled that all allegations of excessive force by law enforcement agents should be analyzed 
in reference to the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard, not a due process standard. 
This case provides the legal foundation for CBP’s Use of Force policy2 and more broadly, it 
established the legal process that contemporary courts use to determine whether any law 
enforcement officer’s use of force is excessive. In practice, the reasonableness standard creates a 
bias toward officers’ perceptions when it comes to judging the validity of their use of force 
decisions (Hassel 2009). Although the legal standards were “sufficiently vague so that nearly all 
shootings…fit the legal criteria for justifiable police homicide” even before Graham (see Waegel 
1984: 146), this decision makes contemporary courts a very friendly environment toward officers 
charged with excessive force. Given the significance of this case, it is worth providing a 
comprehensive overview. 
Graham v. Connor 
Graham was a diabetic who was undergoing an insulin reaction; he asked his friend Berry 
to drive him to the local convenience store to buy some orange juice to counter the “sugar 
reaction.” When he entered the convenience store, he saw that there was a long line to pay and 
immediately exited, asking Berry to drive him to another friend’s house to get orange juice there. 
Officer Connor observed Graham enter and exit the store in a rush and effected a traffic stop to 
investigate the matter. Connor asked Graham and his friend to wait while another officer 
investigated what, if anything, happened at the convenience store. During this waiting period, 
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Graham got out of the car and ran around the vehicle twice before passing out on the curb. Berry 
told the police officers on scene that Graham was undergoing an insulin reaction, but the police 
officers did not seem to believe him. Graham sustained various injuries during the encounter, 
including a broken bone in his foot, cuts on his wrists, bruising on his forehead, and a seemingly 
permanent ringing in his ear. Connor released Graham once he received the report that there was 
nothing amiss at the convenience store.   
Graham sued the officers claiming that their force violated his due process rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit District Court that heard his case 
issued a “directed verdict” in favor of the police officers, which is an order for the jury to return 
a particular verdict. A directed verdict is typically applied when the judge determines that a 
reasonable jury could not reach any other decision. The judge had reached that conclusion after 
considering four factors, which until that point had constituted the test for determining whether a 
law enforcement officer had used excessive force. The test, known as the Johnson v Glick test, 
was established in 1974, and considered four factors: “the need for the application of force, the 
relationship between need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, 
and whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline, or 
maliciously and sadistically”. The judge had ruled that the officers applied force that was 
appropriate under the circumstances and was not “applied maliciously.”  Graham appealed the 
decision and was denied by the Fourth Circuit’s Court of Appeals, which prompted him to take 
the case to the Supreme Court.  
The question that the Supreme Court considered was what constitutional standard should 
govern claims of excessive force by law enforcement officers. In May of 1989, the Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s decision, ruling that all claims of excessive force by should be 
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analyzed in reference to the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard, which guarantees 
that people should be free of unreasonable search and seizure by the government. In effect, the 
Court ruled that the due process standard of the 14th Amendment was not the right test for 
determining the excessiveness of force by government officials.  
The Graham decision is highly consequential because it highlights that there is a specific 
constitutional protection against “physically intrusive government conduct”. However, it also 
rejects the idea that there is a “single generic standard” by which allegations of excessive force 
should be judged. Instead, the Court ruled that to determine whether a particular use of force 
incident is reasonable, courts must weigh the governmental interests at stake in making the 
seizure (i.e. arrest), as well as the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. The most consequential 
component of Judge William H. Rehnquist’s decision is quoted below. I italicize the aspects that 
are most significant for the topic at hand:  
Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an 
arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of 
physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it...The “reasonableness” of a particular use 
of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather 
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight… the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive 
force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are 
“objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without 
regard to their underlying intent or motivation….The calculus of reasonableness must 
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. (Graham v. Connor, 87-6571, 
p. 490, (1989).  
 
What this means in practice is that courts and juries are tasked with evaluating officer force 
decisions considering only the facts and information he/she had at the time of the seizure, 
independent of the officer’s intentions or subjective state of mind. As a result of Graham, the 
legal system is generally friendly to officers. Graham v. Connor essentially creates a bias in 
favor of officers’ perception when it comes to judging the validity of their actions (Hassel 2009).  
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Customs and Border Protection Use of Force Policy 
 
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force is based on the totality of circumstances 
known by the officer/agent at the time of the use of force and weighs the actions of the 
officer/agent against the rights of the subject, in light of the circumstances surrounding 
the event. Reasonableness will be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
officer/agent on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.  
- CBP Use of Force Policy 
 
Border Patrol agents’ use of force training is based on a 117-page policy that was 
released to the public in 2014. As evidenced by the excerpt above, the language of the policy is 
very close to the Rehnquist decision in the Supreme Court case of Graham v. Connor. In 
practice, the policy provides guidance on how Border Patrol agents can use their firearms, less-
lethal weapons (i.e. baton, taser, pepper ball launcher), as well as other control and compliance 
techniques (from verbal commands to physical strikes) they can apply based on subjects’ level of 
resistance. This policy serves as the foundation for how they are trained at the academy, as well 
as at their station. The post-academy training agents receive is conducted 4 times per yea by 
other Border Patrol agents who serve as “Use of Force Instructors3” who have received advanced 
training on this topic. The role of instructors, whose assignment is a temporary “detail4,” is to 
study the policy, and develop and execute training protocols based on this text.  
Agents know that when it comes to judging excessive use of force (be it by Border Patrol 
or other law enforcement officers), courts will be evaluating whether their actions were 
reasonable. The following quote by an instructor demonstrates how agents are taught:   
The policy says we can use force to protect us or protect somebody else. Don’t be afraid 
to use force if you have to. But it has to be level with the force that’s given upon you and 
you have to act reasonably... That’s the main thing. As long as you’re acting reasonably 
and you can justify what you’re doing, go ahead and do it. Do what you need to do.  
-White agent, 10 years of experience 
 
This instructor is giving me an example of what he tells agents during training. He tells them not 
to be “afraid” of using force, as long as it is reasonable and justifiable in terms of their policy. 
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Fortunately for agents, reasonableness can be demonstrated in a wide variety of ways. 
Reasonableness is variable because it is based on the totality of circumstances. According to the 
CBP Use of Force policy:   
Totality of circumstances refers to all factors existing in each individual case. In 
addition to those listed in subsection B.2, these factors may include (but are not limited 
to): 
a. The training, mental attitude, age, size and strength of the officer/agent; 
b. The training, mental attitude, age, size and strength of the subject; 
c. The weapon(s) involved; 
d. The presence of other officers/agents, subjects or bystanders; and 
e. Environmental conditions. 
 
Instructors often provided real-life examples of these factors in their interviews. In practice, if an 
agent is outmatched in physical size, or outnumbered by subjects, then the agent is empowered to 
use force against them. If subjects have weapons with them, then they can expect reasonable 
agents to draw their own weapons. If agents are alone in remote areas of the desert, this 
heightens the threat they perceive, which creates more latitude to define force as reasonable. The 
reference to Section B.2 highlights that the totality of circumstances also includes the 
“objectively reasonable” determination as outlined in Graham v. Connor: 
In determining whether a use of force is “objectively reasonable” an Authorized 
Officer/Agent must give careful attention to the totality of facts and circumstances of 
each particular case, including: 
a. Whether the subject poses an imminent threat to the safety of the officer/agent 
or others; 
b. The severity of the crime at issue; 
c. Whether the subject is actively resisting seizure or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight; 
d. Whether the circumstances are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving; and 
e. The foreseeable risk of injury to involved subjects and others. 
 
As evidenced by the policy excerpts above, agents are trained in a policy with such a broad 
definition of what is reasonable that, barring egregious violations, most agents’ use of force 
meets the legal standard that is used to judge them. This legal and policy context converges with 
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an occupational culture that emphasizes danger, resulting in a situation where agents are open to 
using force as a preemptive control strategy, instead of as a last resort. This helps explain why 
immigrants’ interactions with Border Patrol agents are often wrought with forceful interactions 
that have been described by others as “brutal” (Phillips, Hagan, and Rodriguez 2006) and 
“bordering on criminal” (Martinez, Slack, Heyman 2013). It also helps explain why agents are 
usually found to be acting within policy; 97 percent of complaints of immigrant abuse lodged 
against Border Patrol agents resulted in the decision “no action taken” by the administration 
(Martinez, Cantor, and Ewing 2014).  
Findings 
 
U.S. Border Patrol agents communicate a sense of frustration with the public’s purported 
misjudgments of their use of force decisions, as well as with recent changes to their Use of Force 
policies. Agents’ frustration is based on what they argue is a lack of understanding of the job’s 
dangers, or even a patent disregard for agents’ life. Although an emphasis on danger is a central 
component of police occupational culture (Loftus 2009), Border Patrol agents stress that the 
particularities of their job further aggravate the usual dangers of law enforcement. Agents 
distinguish themselves from state and local police officers by explaining that they work alone 
(i.e. without a partner) in remote areas of the country, where back-up agents are miles away. To 
boot, they argue, agents are almost always outnumbered because “aliens” travel in groups.   
Agents’ frustration oscillates between the longing to be understood, a sense of 
persecution, and finally contempt for the public’s criticism and for bureaucratic leaders’ lack of 
support. Agents’ sense of persecution has at least two implications for the way they understand 
and wield their coercive power. First, the idea that they are unfairly criticized by the public and 
unsupported by their leaders heightens the level of solidarity among agents. This heightened 
	   90 
solidarity means that outsiders’ views are rejected by agents, thwarting the type of accountability 
checks that could lead to changes in their occupational culture around use of force. As a result, 
not only does the gulf between agents and the public widen, but most communication efforts are 
futile because the public and agents are ostensibly speaking a different language. Second, agents’ 
sense of marginalization leads to a sense of fatalism when it comes to use-of-force decisions. 
That is, because agents feel that the political context around this topic is biased against them and 
has even tainted their written policies, their only recourse is to make their use-of-force decisions 
based on their subjective sense of threat and instinct to survive. What this means in practice is 
that agents will err on the side of caution when it comes to using force; their main goal is to “go 
home” at the end of their shift. This takes precedence over public opinion and often even over 
their written policies.  
Reasonableness in Action: Survival Instincts and “Going Home”  
It bothers me that people say stuff like, ‘well, you know, he had a rock and you got a 
gun.’ Okay. But if my life is threatened, I don’t care what he has. I’m going to do 
whatever it takes to go home to my kids. – Latino male, 7 years of experience  
 
Agents emphasize that their training and the legal concept of reasonableness form the 
foundation for their use-of-force practices. However, their narratives also reveal that a more 
subjective sense of threat and survival instinct guides their decisions. As the quote above 
suggests, agents are taught that a successful shift is one where they go home to their families at 
the end of the day. To go home, they have to do whatever it takes to protect themselves. Agents 
often recount past experiences, as well as hypothetical situations, to illustrate what their use-of-
force decisions look like on the ground. In these situations, which I call force incidents for short, 
agents frame themselves as potential victims who have no choice but to defend themselves 
against cunning criminals. Rocks hold a dominant place in these fatalistic accounts.  
	   91 
Rocks Kill   
The issue of rockings gained national notoriety in 20125 when Agent Lonnie Ray Swartz 
shot and killed 16-year-old Jose Antonio Elena Rodriguez through slats in the Nogales border 
fence. Swartz is charged with second-degree murder. According to his supervisor, Leo Cruz-
Mendez, minutes after the shooting Swartz told him: “They were throwing rocks ... They hit the 
(K-9) dog ... I shot and there’s someone dead in Mexico.” (O'Dell 2016). This case has become a 
flashpoint for the battle between immigration advocates and the CBP, as it relates to increasing 
accountability for Border Patrol agents’ use of force. The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) has brought a federal lawsuit asking the Arizona District Court to consider whether the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections against excessive force apply to a Mexican national standing in 
Mexico. Finally, this and other cases of agents using deadly force in response to rockings 
prompted the CBP to issue the following policy statement: 
Authorized Officers/Agents shall not discharge their firearms in response to thrown or 
launched projectiles unless the officer/agent has a reasonable belief, based on the totality 
of circumstances (to include the size and nature of the projectiles), that the subject of 
such force poses an imminent danger of serious physical injury or death to the 
officer/agent or to another person. Officers/agents may be able to obtain a tactical 
advantage in these situations, through measures such as seeking cover or distancing 
themselves from the immediate area of danger.  
 
It is unclear how this directive is different from the previous one because the original text is not 
public. However, the fact that agents often scoff at the idea of taking a tactical advantage to 
avoid escalating the situation suggests that this is the new part of the policy. The following agent 
demonstrates this, stating that the particularities of Border Patrol work makes this directive 
unrealistic: 
…they keep telling us, if you go to the line and somebody throws a rock at you, try to 
stay away. What? No. He’s throwing a rock at me, he’s going to get shot. I don’t care 
what you tell me. Rocks kill. I’ve seen those videos, I’ve seen the pictures. They’re like, 
‘there's new policy’. I don’t care about policy. You’re not out there on the line tracking a 
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group with me… Where am I going to hide? There’s tierra. No trees out here…. Don’t 
throw rocks and you won’t get shot. We don’t shoot at people that don’t do anything. But 
if you’re going to get physical, I want to go home and see my kids. 
 – Latina agent, 8 years of experience 
 
Although this agent’s statement seems to express a patent disregard for policy when it 
comes to rockings, it is actually more nuanced than it appears. First, she emphasizes a broad 
theme in agents’ narratives when it comes to rocks—these projectiles are considered deadly 
weapons and as a result, agents feel justified in responding with deadly force. Based on CBP 
policy, agents are justified in using deadly force when they have “a reasonable belief that the 
subject of such force poses an imminent danger of serious physical injury or death to the 
officer/agent or to another person” (p. 6). Agents are at pains to argue that “rocks kill” and 
emphasize that if they feel their life is threatened by a rock, then they will shoot. It is critical to 
mention that the policy does not prohibit shooting at rock throwers; it says that agents should not 
shoot “unless the officer/agent has a reasonable belief, based on the totality of circumstances” 
that the projectile poses a threat of serious physical harm or death to the agent or another person. 
Therein is the return to the incredibly broad standard of “reasonableness” and the catch-all term 
“totality of circumstances” that set a low bar for agents to prove the validity of their force 
decisions.  
I also want to call attention to the way the quoted agent juxtaposes policy against her on-
the-ground experience. Agents often argue that their use-of-force policy is politically tainted and 
written by people who are far removed from the reality of Border Patrol work. Agents take 
particular exception to the recommendation to seek a tactical advantage in rocking situations, and 
they are also concerned with the same recommendation in regard to moving vehicles. They argue 
that this recommendation does not take account of their environmental conditions—namely, the 
openness and remoteness of the desert areas in which they work. The following agent illustrates: 
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In an urban environment, a guy can run behind an alley, he can get away from a car. And 
I’ve been there. When the vehicle is driving through, I lay a spike strip down, and he 
deliberately tries to run me over, I can’t do anything? I’m supposed to run behind an 
alley? There’s no alleys, there’s no buildings, there’s nothing but greasewood. And so 
I’m going to have to do what I have to do. – White agent, over 20 years of experience 
 
This idea of doing what is necessary, regardless of what policy says they should do, figures 
prominently in agents’ use-of-force narratives. Agents’ perception that their use of force policies 
are ill-formed—because of political pressure on CBP leaders or because they do not accurately 
account for their environmental conditions—practically delegitimizes the policies. This lack of 
legitimacy makes it easier to disregard directives, especially in high-stress situations.  
In effect, agents would rather take their chances with the legal system than with their life. 
The following exchange exemplifies this idea:  
R: …We kind of have a saying, you know, ‘it’s better to be judged by twelve than carried 
by six’. Because a lot of times, that’s really what you have. 
 
I: Do you feel like, is that what’s on the line when you’re out there? 
 
R: Absolutely. We’ve had plenty of agents die…The one in San Diego was Rosas. He 
was actually ambushed. He was ambushed…they began to beat him up, they took his 
gun, and they shot him with his own gun. We have an agent here, Luis Aguilar, that was 
run over by a smuggler as he was attempting to spike the vehicle…. he went for him and 
ran him over... – Latino agent, 11 years of experience 
 
The saying “I’d rather be judged by 12 than carried out by 6” is not unique to Border Patrol 
agents. It is common among law enforcement officers in general and means that they would 
rather act to save their lives in the moment and deal with potential legal consequences later (i.e. 
be judged by a jury of 12) than not act, and be killed in the line of duty (i.e. carried out dead by 6 
pallbearers). This saying reveals a willingness by law enforcement officers “to shoot first in 
potentially dangerous situations” (Waegel 1984: 147). Therefore, when agents talk about “doing 
what they have to do,” they are not merely expressing a willingness to violate policy. These 
fatalistic phrases reveal a deeply-held belief—rooted in law enforcement culture—that the public 
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is unpredictable, that seemingly ordinary situations can “go south” in a matter of seconds, and 
that they should always be on high alert (Loftus 2009). To let their guard down means to become 
complacent, which could cost them their lives. Informal “war stories” that highlight worst-case 
scenarios, no matter how rare they are, are effective ways to prevent complacency. The above-
referenced death of Agent Robert W. Rosas Jr. is a case in point.  
Agent Rosas was responding to a motion sensor in a remote area of the border near 
Campo, California when he was ambushed by four assailants who overpowered him and shot 
him dead with his own weapon. Agents often remark that the assailants were part of a “rip crew,” 
a group of robbers who mostly target drug smugglers and undocumented migrants in remote 
areas of the desert. This rip crew was after Agent Rosas’ night goggles; after they killed him, 
they also took his service weapon and his handcuffs before fleeing to Mexico. The tragic deaths 
of Agent Rosas and Luis Aguilar, who was run over by a drug smuggler, have become 
cautionary tales that are passed on among agents. It is irrelevant that these cases, and their 
perpetuators, are atypical when compared to the agents’ everyday work. These cases highlight 
what could happen in a worst-case scenario and since the stakes are so high (i.e. agents could 
lose their life), their only recourse is to do what they have to do to go home—even if it means 
making mistakes that could cause others to lose their life. As the following agent demonstrates, 
“the details will get worked out later”: 
… recently there was a rocking in San Diego where two guys threw a rock at an agent 
and he shot and killed them... since you’re behind the badge… you look at things a little 
differently… you can just think about that guy probably has a family... I think I heard the 
media ‘oh, is he justified in shooting?’ No. A rock can kill you… I was like, come on 
guys… I don't know if they’re fair and balanced. But for the most part, I just kind of 
ignore that and I just think about hey, that guy, he had to do what he had to do. He had to 
go home. And the details will get worked out. – Latino agent, 2 years of experience  
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Of course, not all tense situations end in agents firing their weapon. As aforementioned, taken as 
a fraction of the apprehensions that agents effect every year, shootings are relatively rare events. 
However, the sense of danger and willingness to engage in preemptive control strategies also 
have implications for how agents engage in other, less-lethal use of force strategies.  
Less-lethal force techniques include physical strikes with fists, as well as with a baton, or 
the use of pepper spray and tasers. According to the CBP’s Use of Force data, this category 
represents 98% (801) of the 816 instances of reported use of force by Border Patrol agents in 
2016. Although the stakes are less high for this type of force (i.e. they are, by definition, not 
lethal), their prevalence makes them critical to understand. In addition, the ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of the appropriate level of physical force is even higher for less-lethal 
techniques than it is for deadly force. Agents are guided by a “Use of Force Continuum,” an 
instructional model that specifies what “level of force” an agent can use based on the subject’s 
level of resistance. The continuum (see Appendix D) specifies general categories of force that 
instructors illustrate through specific techniques, teaching agents how to do joint manipulations 
or pressure strikes. However, in the spur of the moment, it is unlikely that agents will 
mechanically move through the use of force continuum. The following agent demonstrates the 
ambiguity around what type of force is appropriate in high stress situations:   
It’s pitch black. So I’m just kind of going off of feel. And finally I get him to the ground 
and we’re rolling around a little bit and… now that I look back on it… I may have gone a 
little bit overboard. Yeah. But all the adrenaline. And then I remember in that situation, I 
was thinking of those videos, we see a lot of videos of police officers getting shot or 
stabbed and the suspect takes off into the darkness and is gone. So I was thinking about 
that too and I didn’t want to get hurt. Just for this, I didn’t want to get hurt.  
– Latino agent, 5 years of experience  
 
This agent is recounting a nighttime arrest in a remote area of the desert where the “subject” ran 
away from him. In hindsight, he admits that the person was not actually assaulting him, which 
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according to CBP policy would justify the agent using “defensive tactics,” including 
“concentrated strikes” or punches, his baton, and even his taser to gain control of the situation 
(see CBP Use of Force Continuum). He was actually actively resistant, which only garners the 
use of less intrusive “compliance techniques,” like pepper spray, striking pressure points, and 
joint manipulation, among others. However, his adrenaline and sense of threat, partly based on 
the videos he has seen in training, pushed him to go “a little overboard” because he wanted to 
avoid being hurt. He ends by telling me, “CBP wants to put this [the continuum] out… but in 
reality, you’re going to do what you have to do out there to survive or to do your job.” 
Monday-Morning Quarterbacking Split-Second Decisions 
Agents’ emphasis on doing whatever is necessary to survive and go home is closely 
linked to another deeply-held belief—that post-hoc evaluations of agents’ split-second use of 
force decisions are inadequate because no-one can recreate the pressure, adrenaline rush, and 
stress of the actual situation. As a result, efforts to evaluate whether an agent did the right thing 
in a particular scenario are met with disapproval and annoyance by agents. “Monday-morning 
quarterbacking” (MMQ) is the stigmatized practice of criticizing agents’ use of force decisions. 
Anyone can engage in MMQ, but agents are very reticent to do so because 1) they weren’t there; 
2) they know they could be in that situation one day; and 3) they know what it is like to have to 
make split-second decisions in high stress situations. Therefore, MMQ usually refers to the 
media, the wider public, and even the courts’ post hoc evaluations of agents’ use-of-force 
decisions. In effect, the stigma against MMQ stops agents from criticizing each other’s actions, 
which heightens the solidarity among them, increasing the social closure that creates a “wall of 
silence” among law enforcement agents.  
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The emphasis on favoring agents’ viewpoints when evaluating the validity of a use of 
force decision harkens back to the Rehnquist decision in Graham: “The “reasonableness” of a 
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” In addition, the decision builds in “allowance for 
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 
particular situation.” The similarity between the underlying logic of MMQ and the thrust of the 
Rehnquist decision suggests that the legal standards that govern agents’ use of force inform the 
rationales that agents use to justify their and their colleagues’ decisions. The remainder of this 
section delves deeper into this theme, demonstrating not only agents’ resistance to criticizing 
others’ use of force decisions, but also highlighting how they argue that MMQ can put agents’ 
lives at risk by making them “gun-shy.”  
The following quote demonstrates how agents situate the validity of use of force 
decisions squarely within the outlook of the agent in question. This agent’s mention that “nobody 
knows what we go through” is typical of how they communicate their frustration with MMQ: 
… nobody knows what we go through and what actually happened…What people fail to 
know is that time is the biggest factor when it comes to a situation or an action like that. 
If I feel, if at one point I feel my life is in danger, I’m going to react to save my life. And 
people don’t see that because you’re outside looking in. Yeah, you’re not in that 
situation, yeah, you don’t carry a gun, yeah, you don’t have the authority to shoot your 
gun. It’s like Monday morning quarterbacking. I would’ve done this. Why did they do 
that? Nobody knows what we go through. –Latino agent, 7 years of experience 
 
This statement contains all the elements of this theme. First, the agent emphasizes that time is a 
major factor in decision-making, implicitly referencing the allowance in Graham for the fact that 
officers’ use of force decisions are made in a matter of seconds. Second, this agent emphasizes 
that his own threat perception will guide his reaction to save his life. This also can be linked to 
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the Graham decision that the reasonableness of a decision must be judged from the perspective 
of the officer on the scene. Finally, he dismisses the validity of outsiders’ evaluations of these 
decisions, referencing MMQ and highlighting that this is essentially done by people who do not 
know what it is like to be a law enforcement agent. 
 Given agents’ emphasis on the split-second nature of their decision-making processes, I 
wanted to know whether they understood that having such little time could lead to mistakes. 
However, when I probed this issue, agents did not engage in the type of critique that is necessary 
to evaluate whether a particular use of force decision was “reasonable.” Instead, of engaging is 
post-hoc evaluations of past decisions, they focused on the stress of the decision-making process 
itself. The following exchange is typical: 
I: If you have less time, then aren’t you more likely to make mistakes? 
R: Correct…. 
 
I: …if you have such a small amount of time and that increases the probability of 
mistakes, then you make a decision and then it get scrutinized- 
 
R: For months at a time. 
 
I: … you could … have made the wrong decision … 
 
R: Yes. And that’s what law enforcement in general exposes themselves to every time 
they go out in the field. That itself is a burden. And it does play a psychological 
component in decision-making and such – White agent, 9 years of experience  
 
This psychological burden is not rooted in the fact that agents can kill someone by mistake, but 
in the possibility of actually losing their own life. This is not to say that there is a gross disregard 
for life among agents. If that were the case, there would be many more shootings than there are. 
However, this does mean that agents are so socialized into the idea that they could die while 
working, that they are willing to take their chances—even if that means using more force than is 
warranted—in order to go home at the end of their shift. In effect, the psychological burden that 
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agents carry consists of the fear of second-guessing their instinct and making a mistake that 
could cost them their own life, not someone else’s. The following quote demonstrates:  
Guys get gun-shy, for lack of a better phrase. They’re afraid to defend themselves 
because they don’t want to get in trouble. And it’s gotten people hurt. ... And that’s my 
worst fear. ...in my head like ‘I’m gonna use the least amount of force necessary to stop 
this guy from hurting me’. But at the same time, it’s a fine line... what if I choose just on 
the side of not using enough force, right? And he uses more force than I thought he was 
going to use and I get hurt or killed? –White agent, 10 years of experience 
 
 In this narrative, the fact that agents can get “gun-shy” because they “don’t want to get in 
trouble” is an undesirable consequence of too much MMQ by people who are uninformed of 
what it is like to be a law enforcement officer. As evidenced by the quote above, agents believe 
that making the wrong decisions could cost them their life. Seldom do agents consider the other 
person’s life when they are discussing these types of scenarios. For them, the right decision is 
one where they survive: “I try and tell people, if you’re put in a position where you have to make 
a split-second decision, it’s either you or them, I hope you make the right decision” (White 
female agent, 17 years of experience).  
To an outsider, agents’ emphasis on saving their own life seems like an effort to 
exaggerate the dangers of the job to justify an inclination to use force in an anticipatory way, 
instead of as a last resort. That could very well be true in some cases. However, it is critical to 
note that these perspectives are not unique to the Border Patrol and are not individual-level 
dispositions. These fatalistic views are a central feature of police culture and are created and 
nurtured through official bureaucratic ideologies and professional training (Terrill, Paoline, and 
Manning 2003). The following agent hints at the socialization process as he tells me about his 
experience at the academy: 
I had my preconceived notions about what law enforcement can and can’t do. And I 
remember when I was doing the training at the academy, they were explaining stuff to 
me, and I remember the first thing, ‘that just doesn’t seem acceptable. Why would you 
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react that way? It seems like overkill or rude or-.’ Then they explained it and it all makes 
sense. But until you’ve had somebody get in front of you and explain it and show you 
video and show you statistics and show you numbers, you can’t automatically make that 
connection. –White agent, 5 years of experience  
 
As evidenced by the quote above, the agents’ training teaches them that they have to “be the 
aggressor,” as one agent put it, or be in control in order to protect themselves. While this seems 
like “overkill” to the agent at first, it begins to make sense once they (i.e. instructors at the 
academy) explain the dangers of the job. Therefore, while it is a fact—based on the marginal 
number of assaults against agents—that agents have an inflated sense of danger, the reality of 
their job does not make their subjective sense of threat any less real. Furthermore, it is this sense 
of threat that is highly consequential for those who are subject to agents’ coercive power because 
their perceptions guide their decisions, knowing that the legal standards are broad enough to 
justify most instances of force.  
Who’s the Victim Here? 
 Just as agents resist criticizing colleagues’ use-of-force decisions, they also resist 
engaging in direct justification of particular cases because they hold steadfast to the idea that the 
only valid perspective is that of the agent who was there. What they will do, in defense of 
colleagues, is deflect attention to the shooting victim and try to discredit their moral character. 
This is an important distinction between engaging in MMQ of particular cases (which entails 
detailed critique and evaluation of whether an officer acted reasonably) and choosing to focus on 
another element of the situation—the threat that the person on the other end of the gun may have 
posed to the agent. Agents often rely on what they perceive as biased and incomplete media 
coverage of particularly publicized use-of-force decisions to make their point about the character 
of shooting victims. Because of massive media attention toward the Swartz shooting of 16-year-
old Antonio Elena Rodriguez, agents focus on how victims’ age can be misleading. In particular, 
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they argue that talking about “young” or “teenage” victims creates a sense of innocence that 
masks their criminal history. The following quote demonstrates this: 
I think the media will put something out there that is going to sell… the headline is never 
going to be “Border Patrol Agent Shoots Seventeen Year Old Child That’s Turning 
Eighteen in Two Months Throwing Rocks the Size of Softballs Along With His Friends 
off a Fence in X City.” It’s never gonna be that. It’s “Border Patrol Agent Shoot Child 
With Rock.” Why? Because it’s going to sell. … They’re never going to put that the child 
had criminal history dating back to when he was twelve for smuggling drugs and 
everything else. The headline is going to be “Border Patrol Agent Shoots Child With 
Rock” and that’s it.  – Latino agent, 11 years of experience 
 
On the surface, this quote expresses agents’ dissatisfaction with the media providing a skewed 
version of events for their own profit. However, this perspective reveals an underlying logic that 
is central to law enforcement culture: that different types of people deserve different treatment 
depending on their moral character (Wahl 2014). For law enforcement officers, a criminal record 
is the most obvious indicator of a subject’s immorality. Stated simplistically, bad guys deserve it, 
where “it” is sometimes rough treatment or even death. Given this assumption that bad guys 
deserve it, agents believe that if the public had more information about the criminality of those 
shot by Border Patrol agents, then they would agree that agents made the right decision and 
would perhaps be less quick to pass harsh judgment: 
[Media says] They shot this poor innocent girl or boy on the border fence. They [media] 
make them out, a lot of them, to be angel children when they're known smugglers. 
They're known, we call them, I'll just say robbers. They just rob people. They do 
whatever they can. It doesn't matter who they're robbing or who they're raping or who 
they're doing whatever to as long as they come out financially better, that's all they care 
about. So it's frustrating. We can't tell our story. Again, it goes back to that. If you weren't 
throwing a rock in the first place, we wouldn't be forced to use force…You're putting us 
in a position where we have to make a choice. And the choice is to preserve ourselves 
and others around us. White female agent, 17 years experience 
 
The statement that agents cannot tell their own story presumes that if allowed to, they could 
convince people to agree with them. This perspective overlooks the fact that agents are members 
of an occupational group that believes that “bad guys deserve it;” this is why they believe that 
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discrediting the victim is an effective way of justifying excessive force. However, this is a 
unique perspective that they have been socialized into and that the wider public may not actually 
agree with. Immigration advocates and civil rights lawyers who will face agents in court, for 
instance, will definitely not agree with this defense. In effect, this justification merely reminds us 
that by virtue of their socialization, agents speak a different language than large swaths of the 
public when it comes to use of force.  
Discussion 
 
Border Patrol agents believe that their survival instinct should guide their use  
of force decisions. This instinct to do what is necessary to go home at the end of their shift 
emerges from the sense of grave danger that agents perceive in their job. This sense of danger is 
inflated, as evidenced by the low rate of assault, deadly or not, against USBP agents. 
Nevertheless, agents’ subjective sense of threat—which is created and nourished through formal 
training and informal socialization processes—is highly consequential because it shapes how 
willing agents are to engage in force, as well as how agents justify decisions after force has 
happened. In practice, agents’ culture around use of force may lead them to diverge from written 
rules, because their subjective sense of threat is thought to be a more valid guide for their 
decisions. I argue that the legal standard of “reasonableness” legitimizes agents’ instinctual 
approach to using force because it creates a bias in favor of law enforcement agents’ perceptions 
when it comes to judging the validity of their force decisions. In turn, agents strategically deploy 
the reasonableness standard when discussing the reach of their coercive power. 
I also show that agents’ frustration with the public’s criticism of police use of force 
creates a sense of persecution among agents. This sense of persecution leads them to believe that 
their decisions will be criticized no matter what they do—therefore, they should rely on their 
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instincts to make decisions and “worry about the details later.” This cynicism nourishes the 
insular character of police culture, leading agents to become even more reliant on each other for 
validation. This creates solidarity among agents that can lead to a “wall of silence” around use of 
force. This wall of silence is evidenced by agents’ unwillingness to criticize other agents’ use-of-
force decisions, opting instead to discredit the moral character of shooting victims. 
 Agents’ use of force narratives tell us a great deal about the normative tenets that underlie 
their decisions in this area. From their perspective, they can legitimately wield their coercive 
power when their sense of threat reaches a subjective threshold. This shows that my respondents 
situate the validity of their coercive actions squarely within their own perception, effectively 
disregarding those who are on the receiving end of their actions. It is only when they are forced 
to engage on the topic of controversial decisions that agents are willing to discuss the recipients 
of their coercion and even then, they will only do so to question their moral character. This 
worldview emerges from and is reinforced by the legal standard of reasonableness that governs 
all law enforcement agents’ use of force.  
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1 According to the CBP use of force includes: “firearm,” “less-lethal device,” or “other less-
lethal force.” The use of batons, electronic control weapons (e.g. tasers), offensive driving 
techniques, physical strikes, or other force applications are less lethal techniques.  
 
2 It is critical to note there are wide  differences between federal law and departmental use of 
force policies. According to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, where agents are 
trained, federal law determines how the agents are going to be judged in court if they ever find 
themselves in a lawsuit.   
 
3 I interviewed 4 Use of Force Instructors, participated in 3 mock use-of-force training sessions, 
and sat in on 2 presentations given by Use of Force instructors. Unsurprisingly, I found that 
instructors are more likely than other Border Patrol agents to reference constitutional law when 
discussing force. However, almost all Border Patrol agents reference their “training” and 
“policy” when they talk about force.  
 
4 This temporary assignment is acquired on a competitive basis. The average detail for Use of 
Force instructors is approximately 2 years.  
 
5 Also in 2012, in El Paso/Ciudad Juarez agent Mesa shot 15-year-old Sergio Adrian Hernandez 
Guereca as he hid behind a column 60 feet into Mexico. The agent alleges that he was 
surrounded by rock throwers, a claim that video footage does not support, but his lawyer has said 
that a video taken by a different tower camera does corroborate it. Agent Mesa was not 
disciplined by CBP.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
The Durability Borders in a Globalized World 
 
The guiding premise of this dissertation is that the United States’ punitive approach to 
immigration control is incompatible with the character of immigration phenomena. Political 
rhetoric frames unauthorized migrants and even asylum-seeking families as security risks, 
denying the humanitarian issues and economic inequalities that push and pull people away from 
their home countries. These arguments are part and parcel of the immigration law making 
process and are therefore fused into statutory changes and ultimately translated into the policy 
procedures that immigration bureaucrats must implement. This is why the schism between the 
ideology and reality of immigration is most apparent at the implementation stage, where agents 
are forced to contend, for themselves and others, with the distance between doctrines and facts 
(Ellermann 2009).  
Examining the occupational culture of the agents who are charged with implementing 
these mismatched policies paints a picture of immigration law-in-action. Drawing on semi-
structured interviews, I examine how U.S. Border Patrol agents explain their work, contest 
outsiders’ criticisms, and rationalize contentious aspects of their job. By doing so, I piece 
together two equally tangible social realities in which these agents exist. Yes, they are state 
agents who are employed by a paramilitary organization whose mission is to “protect the 
American Homeland”. As such, their primary orientation is toward strict law abidance, order, 
and control. And yes, they are also “human”—as they often say to communicate their empathy, 
or at least distanced sympathy for immigrants. But, independent of agents’ individual-level 
sensitivities (i.e. whether or not they actually feel bad for immigrants) is their inescapable 
awareness of the Border Patrol’s reputational issues and the fact that large swaths of the public 
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see their work as morally ambiguous or even worse, callous and bigoted. As social beings, they 
are compelled to account for these legitimacy issues. I capitalize on agents’ quest for self and 
organizational legitimacy to distil the normative tenets and institutional logics that underpin 
these powerful actors’ culture and their moral authority. 
 My findings show that Border Patrol agents understand themselves as law enforcement 
officers first and foremost. They view immigrants as criminals, just as they see unauthorized 
migration a security and crime control problem. Border Patrol agents’ law enforcement 
orientation is not itself a discovery; we know that the United States is governing immigration 
through crime (Dowling and Inda 2013) and that immigration has become securitized throughout 
the world (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014; Woude, Leun, and Nijland 2014). But, 
despite a broad-reaching consensus that immigration has been criminalized through changes in 
legal statutes and political discourse, it is less clear how immigration agents qualify that 
criminalization, even as they legitimize it and ultimately reproduce it. This ground-level analysis 
is necessary to better understand the implementation processes and ensuing implications of the 
United States’ punitive approach to immigration control. Therefore, by training my analytic lens 
on Border Patrol agents’ culture, I take a critical step toward opening up highly guarded doors of 
the U.S. immigration system in this era of crimmigration (Stumpf 2006; Stumpf 2013).   
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Chapter 2 initiates the empirical analysis by examining how Border Patrol agents sort 
migrants into different categories of deservingness and criminality. This chapter sets the 
foundation for the remainder of the dissertation by making explicit agents’ categorization 
schemas, their little-known work routines, and their occupational worldview. I demonstrate that 
although agents recognize different “types” of undocumented border crossers—distinctions that 
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amount to a concession that not all migrants are criminals—at the point of arrest, these 
differences are obsolete. When making arrests, agents adhere to a self-protective logic, created 
and nourished through bureaucratic training that frames immigrants as essentially inscrutable and 
potentially dangerous. This premise that immigrants are inscrutable aliens is critical in securing 
agents’ compliance with arrest and processing procedures that are modeled after the criminal 
justice system, even as agents’ day-to-day work consists mostly of interactions with non-
criminals. I argue that this way of understanding their job and immigrants is a function of their 
professional training in law enforcement procedures and their bureaucracy’s ideology, as well as 
informal lessons that are passed on as war stories from agent to agent. 
Having established that agents recognize moral distinctions between unauthorized 
immigrants, in chapter three I hone in on the narratives that agents’ deploy to justify the United 
States’ punitive approach to immigration control. At its core, this chapter demonstrates how 
agents reconcile the moral ambiguity that is a prominent feature of border enforcement and 
immigration control work in general. I show that agents are forced to contend with moral 
ambiguities in two major ways: one-on-one interactions with deserving migrants, and public 
criticism of their work. I conceptualize these mechanisms as threats to their moral authority and 
analyze the narratives that agents deploy in response: criminalization as corrective, insecurity of 
immigrant identities, and caring control. The first two narratives dispute immigrants’ morality, 
while the last one draws on compassionate discourses to establish agents’ morality. Despite their 
varied substance, these narratives have a constant function; they allow agents to restore their 
moral authority and the legitimacy of the broader control apparatus they represent. In doing so, 
these legitimation narratives repair the normative foundation of agents’ authority, allowing them 
to continue with an uncritical performance of their inherently exclusionary professional role.  
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Since the previous two chapters show that outsiders’ criticism is a salient issue for agents, 
in chapter four I hone in on Latino agents for whom these criticism are particularly salient, 
common, and racialized. Since the bulk of agents’ work targets are also Latinos, examining 
whether these agents believe that their ethno-racial background impacts their work practices is an 
excellent way of revealing how agents negotiate outsiders’ views of them and their professional 
role. I show that these agents adopt two modes of professionalism: impartial professionalism 
negates the relevance of racial similarity between agents and immigrants, while compassionate 
professionalism embraces this similarity to improve the qualitative character of immigrants’ 
experiences with the bureaucracy. Regardless of agents’ preferred mode of professionalism, all 
Latino agents receive social sanctions for transgressing normative expectations of ethnic 
solidarity from immigrants and other co-ethnics. Therefore, my analysis also examines the 
symbolic boundaries they deploy in response to these social sanctions. Overall, this chapter 
reveals both the promise and limitations of agents’ individual subjectivities and actions in 
creating a more compassionate immigration control system. 
In the final empirical chapter I examine how agents understand, wield and justify their 
coercive power. The authority to exercise force on behalf of the state is a fundamental feature of 
law enforcement officers’ role and one that is wrought with moral ambiguity. As such, 
understanding how agents legitimize their use of force practices gets to the heart of my interest in 
agents’ moral authority. I show that agents communicate a strong sense of persecution rooted in 
the public’s outcry against law enforcement agents’ excessive force. From agents’ perspectives, 
the public is effectively disqualified from criticizing their decisions, given their inexperience 
with the high-pressure, dangerous situations they face, as well as their unfamiliarity with law 
enforcement training procedures. Agents’ sense of persecution heightens the solidarity among 
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them and leads to a sense of fatalism when it comes to their force decisions. In other words, 
because agents feel that the political context is biased against them, their only recourse is to 
make use-of-force decisions based on their subjective sense of threat and instinct to survive. This 
sense of threat is created and nourished by the bureaucratic ideology of criminalization, as well 
as rare but highly publicized instances of agents losing their lives in the line of duty. I argue that 
agents’ instinctual approach to force is legitimized by the standard of “reasonableness”, which 
creates a bias in favor of officer perception when it comes to judging their decisions. 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 By studying Border Patrol agents’ occupational culture, I reveal the normative foundation 
of their and the state’s moral authority to exclude foreigners, as well as the logics that drive their 
work practices. I argue that these meaning-making rationales are highly consequential because 
they shape how agents interpret their professional role, socially construct migrants, and 
eventually, impact the decisions they make on the job. However, linking agents’ narratives to 
observed behavior is beyond the scope of this analysis and is an important direction for future 
research. Since the Department of Homeland Security’s gatekeeping structures make it difficult 
for researchers to observe agent-immigrant interactions in a long-term, systematic way, 
researchers should excavate different data sources for evidence of agents’ behavior. For example, 
bureaucratic documents can be excellent indicators of agents’ decisions, and when linked to their 
demographic characteristics, these documents may tell the story of how social group 
memberships impact their practices. Acquiring these types of data may also be complicated by 
the secretive nature of the U.S. immigration control bureaucracy and would require Freedom of 
Information Act request(s). However, documents are perhaps one of the best ways to link agents’ 
narratives to their practices, absent the access for ethnographic observations. 
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 In this analysis I have argued for looking behind discretion at the cultural logics that 
precede it and semi-structured interviews are an excellent data source to do this. My analysis of 
agents’ occupational culture demonstrates that enforcement-minded bureaucrats are not trained 
or socialized to account for humanitarian concerns when it comes to granting relief to 
immigrants (McLeod 2012; Rabin 2013). This relatively straightforward, but fundamental point 
reminds us that the viability of humanitarian-minded immigration reforms is contingent on these 
informal cultures, not just the black-and-white letter of the law. Documents will be an excellent 
tool to assess this premise, given that they reflect mundane bureaucratic life, as well as broad 
decision-making patterns in this these institutions (Hull 2012). Seminal studies of administrative 
discretion, like Calavita’s (1992), “Inside the State” and pivotal histories of the Border Patrol, 
like Lytle-Hernandez’s “La Migra” (2010), are excellent examples that scholars can achieve 
dynamic and analytically sophisticated accounts of bureaucratic politics through archival 
research. Yet, these types of works have been scarce since the 2003 government restructure that 
gave birth to the Department of Homeland Security and we must update our knowledge to 
account for these important politico-bureaucratic changes.  
 Another critical way to confirm that and examine how agents’ meaning-making rationales 
shape their behavior is to interview the targets of their work efforts—immigrants themselves. 
Immigrants’ perspectives will be especially helpful in examining procedural justice (i.e. 
perceptions of respectful treatment and transparent decision-making) within the U.S. 
immigration bureaucracy. In chapter three, I engage most explicitly with agents’ legitimacy 
claims, and posit that the substance of these claims have implications for how they do their job. 
This link between legitimacy narratives and work practices has been suggested by others, who 
hypothesize that officers’ belief in their own moral authority serves as a guide for their work 
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approach (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz 2014; Justice and Mesko 
2015). A hypothetical example illustrates this premise. Officers who believe that their legitimacy 
rests on their role as a punishers of immorality will likely interact with their subjects differently 
(perhaps more harshly), than officers who base their moral authority on playing a helping, 
community service role vis-à-vis the public. In turn, these officers’ behaviors shape the 
qualitative experience their “subjects” have with the legal system they represent, and 
subsequently their evaluations of the legitimacy of the system. And finally, citizens’ evaluations 
of the legitimacy of the legal system shape their willingness to engage in voluntary compliance 
with the system’s rules. These are the broad contours of procedural justice theory, which has 
received a great deal of support in criminology (Tyler 2006a; Tyler and Jackson 2013).  
 The link between legitimacy and voluntary compliance has been tested in U.S. border 
control by Emily Ryo. Ryo (2013; 2015) demonstrates that Latin American immigrants’ belief 
that U.S. border enforcement is morally illegitimate explains why otherwise law-abiding people 
do not comply with immigration law. My analysis complements Ryo’s work by providing a 
much-needed look at the other end of the bureaucratic encounter between immigrants and the 
state. By examining if and how agents’ belief in their legitimacy shapes their practices, I can 
examine feedback loops between agents’ self-beliefs and immigrants’ experiences with this 
control bureaucracy. For instance, I show that Latino agents communicate more empathy for 
immigrants than non-Latino agents and purport engaging in certain practices to improve the 
custodial experience for immigrants. Yet, without immigrants’ perspectives, it is difficult to 
assess the veracity of agents’ reports and the impact of their practices on the target population. 
Therefore, an important next step for those of us interested in immigration agents’ legitimacy 
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claims is to link these claims to their behaviors, and then examine how their behaviors impact 
immigrants’ evaluations of procedural justice of the U.S. immigration control system. 
IMPLICATIONS 
 Border Patrol agents grapple with the disjuncture between the macro level, politico-
bureaucratic ideologies that define immigrants as criminals and the micro level reality of their 
work. Their law enforcement orientation is satisfied when they foil drug smuggling attempts, 
arrest previously deported sexual predators, and rescue human trafficking victims from their 
depraved keepers. Yet, these archetypal “bad guys” are scarce. Border Patrol agents spend the 
bulk of their days—and their careers—tracking, arresting, and removing foreigners who have 
violated U.S. immigration law. If agents consistently adhered to the narrow definition of 
criminality, where a criminal is someone who has broken a law, then there would be little 
dissonance between ideology and reality. However, agents draw a boundary between foreigners 
illegally crossing to improve their life and those who commit other, less morally-justifiable 
criminal acts. This moral sorting and agents’ front row seat to the human suffering created by the 
inherently inequitable system of bordered nation-states impels them toward justification.  
But, in the end, I show that agents are successful in confirming the legitimacy of their 
professional role and that of the broader immigration system. They qualify, yet ultimately 
reproduce the ideologies of immigrant criminality and danger that permeate their bureaucratic 
life, even with ample evidence to the contrary. One can imagine an alternative scenario where 
bureaucrats recognize that their practices are a mismatch for the phenomenon they are managing 
and try to bring about changes in their routines. This what agents may believe they are doing 
when they act compassionately toward immigrants, by giving them extra comfort items and 
treating them with respect. Yet, these “caring control” practices (see Chapter three) or 
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“compassionate professionalism” (see Chapter four) mode are limited to a small number of 
agents and do not fundamentally change the bureaucracy’s procedures. As a result, these 
practices are unlikely to bring about broad changes, even as they may assuage agents’ dilemmas 
and have individual-level impacts on immigrants’ experiences. 
Therefore, I argue that agents quest for legitimacy serves a critical stabilizing function 
within the U.S. immigration bureaucracy. By deploying a variety of narratives, claims, and 
rituals, agents create a social reality where the government’s approach fits the crime, and where 
they are the virtuous envoys of the state’s rational and sensible approach to dealing with 
immigration law breaking (Ugelvik 2016). In turn, this legitimacy stifles the potential for internal 
critiques that could bring about change in the immigration control bureaucracy (Johnson, Dowd, 
and Ridgeway 2006). That agents reconcile instead of challenge mismatched practices is not 
surprising given their law enforcement socialization, low position in the command structure of 
their paramilitaristic organization, and social identity processes that push individuals with 
stigmatized group memberships to repair them (Thumala, Goold, and Loader 2011). It is unlikely 
that these pulls toward justification will wane any time soon, since they are a fundamental 
product of social life (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). This suggests that bringing the U.S. 
immigration control bureaucracy’s approach in line with the reality of migration phenomena will 
require external pressure and a top-down changes that seem implausible, especially given today’s 
political context on immigration.  
 As of this writing, President Trump is attempting to realize his campaign promise of 
building an impenetrable wall along the United States’ southern border. Across the Atlantic 
ocean, the existence of the European union is being threatened precisely because of its lack of 
borders. And in the global south, borders that were established by colonizers have become 
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reinterpreted and intensified as globalization triggers South-South migration. It seems that the 
flat world that globalization promised only applies to commodities—not people. Given the 
inherent inequality of a bordered world and that the maintenance of sovereignty demands 
coercive power, questions about the moral legitimacy of territorial borders will persist. Until the 
United States and other Western democracies reconcile the gap between liberal ideals and their 
punitive approach to immigration control, the moral authority of the state and its agents will 
continue to be precarious grounds.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics by Sector (N = 60) 
      Arizona California  Total 
      N (%)  n (%)   N (%) 
Sex  
    Male     27 (73%) 20 (87%)  47 (78%) 
    Female     10 (27%)  3  (13%)  13 (22%) 
 
Race/Ethnicity         
    Latina/o     21(57%) 16 (70%)  37 (62%) 
    Mixed Latino    1   (3%) 1   (4%)  2    (3%)  
    White     12 (32%) 4   (17%)  16  (27%)  
    Black       0  0   0 
    Asian/Pacific Islander     0  2   (9%)  2     (3%) 
    Native American/Other    3  (8%) 0   3     (5%) 
       
Education  
High School Diploma   12 (32%) 1   (4%)  13 (22%) 
 Some College    8   (22%) 13 (57%)  20 (33%) 
Associate’s Degree   2   (5%) 2   (9%)  4   (7%) 
Baccalaureate Degree   10 (27%) 7   (30%)  17 (28%) 
Master’s Degree   2   (5%) 0   2   (3%) 
 Missing Data    3   (8%) 0   3   (5%) 
          
Veterans 
Yes      13 (35%) 9   (39%)  22 (37%)  
No      24 (65%) 14 (61%)  38 (63%) 
 
Average Years with Border Patrol       
1-5     2   (5%) 5   (22%)          7   (12%)  
5-10     14 (38%) 15 (65%)  29 (48%) 
more than 10    21 (57%) 3   (13%)  24 (40%) 
 
Number      37  23   60 
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APPENDIX B  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Desert Town, 
Arizona” 
FY2014 FY2015 Change (+/-) 
Agent Staffing 859 804 - 
Apprehensions 5,902 7,142 + 
   Mexicans 4,247 (72%) 3,845 (54%) - 
   Women 872 (15%) 1,784 (25%) + 
   Juveniles 785 (13%) 2,089 (29%) + 
Assaults 6 (.10%) 8 (.11%) + 
Prosecutions  3,986 (67%) 2,071 (29%) - 
“Center City, CA” FY2014 FY2015 Change (+/-) 
Agent Staffing 1,074 1,004 - 
Apprehensions 14,511 12,820 - 
   Mexicans 12,511(86%) 11,320 (88%) + 
   Women 1,831 (13%) 2,035 (16%) + 
   Juveniles 1,014 (7%) 1,052 (8%) + 
Assaults 28 (.19%) 39 (.30%) + 
Prosecutions  1,422 (10%) 1,352 (10%) No change 
Table 2. Sector Descriptions 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 3. Categories of Migrants 
 
 Worst of the Worst Labor Migrants Victims of 
Circumstance 
Types of People *Cartel members  
*Human smugglers  
*Murderers  
*MS-13 gang members 
*Sexual predators 
*Terrorists  
*People with 
immigration 
violations, but no 
criminal record 
*Women (especially 
very young or very 
old) 
*Women with 
children 
*Young children   
*Family units 
(submissive father, 
mother, young 
child/children) 
*Very old men 
 
Frequency of 
Interactions 
Least Most No frequency 
assigned 
Level of 
Criminality 
Most Mid-range Least 
Satisfaction/Social 
Status Gained 
Most  Mid-range Least  
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APPENDIX D 
Figure 1. Use of Force Model 
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